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A New Look at Criminal Liability
for Selling Dangerous Vehicles:
Lessons from General Motors
and Toyota
STEVEN B. DOW AND NAN S. ELLIS

Automobile safety is one of the most serious public health issues facing our
country. In addition to the costs in terms of personal injury and death,
automobile accidents cost society billions of dollars in lost productivity and
medical costs.1 In 1966, there were over 50,000 deaths from automobile
accidents. By 2015, this number had fallen to approximately 35,000 deaths
and 2.4 million injuries resulting from automobile accidents.2 By some
measures, this is a remarkable reduction that might lead us to conclude that
automobile safety is no longer an important public policy concern. The
reduction in automobile deaths has been due to several factors, including
increased focus on drunk driving, the use of seat belts and the lowering of
speed limits.3 The reduction does not necessarily mean that cars
themselves are safer. In fact, in 2014, over sixty-four million vehicles were
recalled because of safety concerns.4 This number represents a staggering
 Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University
 Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Loyola University Maryland
1. U.S. Department of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2020
Report, (1997), http://www.nhtsa.gov/nhtsa/whatis/planning/2020Report/2020report.html [https://
perma.cc/9YQ3-CYTL]. In 1966, the National Academy of Sciences published a white paper entitled
“Accidental Death and Disability – The Neglected Disease of Modern Society.” The report likened
automobile safety issues to an epidemic and argued that this “neglected epidemic of modern society
[was] the nation’s most important environmental health problem.” National Academy of Sciences,
ACCIDENTAL DEATH AND DISABILITY – THE NEGLECTED DISEASE OF MODERN SOCIETY, 5 (1966)
(cited in Aaron Ezroj, Product Liability After Unintended Acceleration: How Automotive Litigation Has
Evolved, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 470, 473 (2014)).
2. NHTSA Stats, May 2017, https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812348.
In 1996, there were over 6.8 million crashes resulting in over 41,000 deaths and 3.5 million injuries.
NHTSA Report, supra note 1.
3. These three factors are cited by the CDC as actions that can be taken to further reduce
accidents and deaths. Center for Disease Control Motor Vehicle Crash Deaths, July 18, 2016,
https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/motor-vehicle-safety/index.html.
4. Rena Steinzor, (Still) “Unsafe at Any Speed”: Why Not Jail for Auto Executives?, 9 HARV. L.

[1]
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forty-five percent of all passenger cars registered in 2012!5 A number of
high-profile cases have drawn attention to the problem and serve as
examples for the issue to be discussed in this article.
On September 18, 2015, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced
that it had entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with
General Motors (GM) stemming from an ignition-switch defect which
allegedly killed at least 169 people.6 In this agreement, GM promised to
pay a $900-million fine and accepted independent monitoring.7 This
followed Toyota Motor Corporation (Toyota) entering into a DPA with the
DOJ in which it agreed to pay $1.2 billion for wire fraud for failure to
disclose safety issues related to unintended acceleration in a number of its
models.8
The announcement of the DPA with GM was met with severe
criticism.9 Critics noted that the $900-million fine was insignificant when
compared to the $156 billion GM reported in revenue.10 Moreover, critics
called for individual and corporate criminal responsibility. Clarence
Ditlow of the Center for Auto Safety said, “Yet no one from GM went to
jail or was even charged with criminal homicide. This shows a weakness
in the law not a weakness in the facts. GM killed innocent consumers. GM
has paid millions of dollars to its lobbyists to keep criminal penalties out of
the Vehicle Safety Act since 1966. Today thanks to its lobbyists, GM
officials walk off scot free while its customers are six feet under.”11 Public

& POL’Y REV. 443 (2015).
5. Id.
6. Drew Harwell, GM to Pay a $900 Million Fine for Fatal Ignition Switch, WASH. POST (Sept.
18, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2015/09/17/why-general-motors-900million-fine-for-a-deadly-defect-is-just-a-slap-on-the-wrist/?utm_term=.e2eac7d4d64f
[https://perma.cc/HW2P-EEHK].
7. This followed an agreement reached with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) on May 16, 2014, in which it agreed to pay a $35 million civil penalty and to be subjected to
NHTSA oversight. U.S. Department of Transportation Announces Record Fines, Unprecedented
Oversight Requirements in GM Investigation, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PRESS RELEASE,
May 16, 2014, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/2014/DOT-Announces-RecordFines,-Unprecedented-Oversight-Requirements-in-GM-Investigation [hereinafter DOT Press Release].
8. Justice Department Announces Criminal Charge Against Toyota Motor Corporation and
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with $1.2 Billion Financial Penalty, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PRESS
RELEASE, (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-criminalcharge-against-toyota-motor-corporation-and-deferred [hereinafter DOJ Press Release].
9. David Ingram, Corporate “Siloing” an Obstacle to Charging GM Employees – Prosecutor,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/gm-settlement-individuals-idUS
L1N11N17E20150917.
10. Harwell, supra note 6.
11. Critics Rip GM Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Engine Switch Case, CORPORATE CRIME
REPORTER (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/critics-rip-gm-deferredprosecution-in-switch-case/ [https://perma.cc/49CU-83DQ]. Professor Brandon Garrett has been
quoted as saying, “It is deeply disturbing if GM settles this case in a deferred prosecution, out of court,
with no individuals charged . . . . A case this serious should result in a criminal conviction for the
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Citizen’s Rob Weissman noted that “This deal will not deter future
corporate wrongdoers, it will not hold GM accountable and it sets back the
demand for justice by the family members of the victims of GM’s horrible
actions.”12 In defending the DPA, Preet Bharara, the U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York at the time, said that “the law doesn’t
always let us do what we wish we could.”13 Acknowledging the difficulty
in getting a criminal conviction, Bharara admitted that it is not unlawful for
an automobile manufacturer to put potentially deadly cars on the market.14
Ditlow asserted “the law is just inadequate to the crime.”15 A limited
number of scholars have also voiced criticism calling for criminal liability
for top GM executives.16
If the issue of automobile safety is perceived as one of high priority,
why are the laws inadequate to address it? The traditional approach to
products liability, including liability stemming from defective automobiles,
has been one of civil tort liability. Injured consumers of defective products
can sue manufacturers and sellers of those products for negligence. When
cars became prevalent and the resulting injuries from automobile accidents
became common, the law responded.
By eliminating the privity
requirement and making it easier for injured consumers and bystanders to
sue sellers and manufacturers of defective products, civil liability remained
the primary regulatory mechanism. Punitive damages could be imposed to
punish egregious wrongdoing; compensatory damages were awarded to
make injured consumers whole. In this way, plaintiffs were compensated,
defendants were supposedly deterred from selling dangerous products and
those whose behavior was particularly egregious were punished with
punitive damages.
In 1966, this scheme of private tort liability was supplemented by
creation of the NHTSA.17 The NHTSA was created to address a perceived
public health concern—the number of highway injuries and deaths. Under
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (“Vehicle

company, and many criminal convictions for the individuals involved.” Id.
12. Id. Professor Garrett continued, “It is unconscionable that a giant corporation can conceal
information about deadly safety defects for a decade, be responsible for the deaths of more than 100
people as a result and escape any criminal liability based only a corporate fine and a promise not to do
wrong again in the future. It is equally unconscionable that none of the executives inside General
Motors responsible are going to be held criminally accountable …”
13. Why the law doesn’t actually cover GM’s deadly defects, PBS NEWSHOUR (Sept. 17, 2015),
accessed at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law-doesnt-actually-cover-gms-deadly-defects [https://
perma.cc/YV4T-CNK7].
14. Ingram, supra note 9.
15. Harwell, supra note 6.
16. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446 (“[I]ndividual executives with the power to establish early
warning systems and repair defects quickly must perceive a personal threat if they do not act”).
17. NHTSA 2020 Report, supra note 1.
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Safety Act”) and the Highway Safety Act of 1966, the NHTSA was
charged with “reducing deaths, injuries and economic losses resulting from
motor vehicle crashes. This was accomplished by setting and enforcing
safety performance standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle
equipment, and through grants to state and local governments to enable
them to conduct effective local highway safety programs.”18 The primary
way in which the NHTSA assures automobile safety is through product
recalls.
In this article, we will argue that automobile safety is still a major
public health concern in light of the large number of recalls and the highprofile cases of the last few years. We will further argue and that the
current approach (of civil liability supplemented by the NHSTA) is
inadequate to deter automobile manufacturers from designing and selling
dangerous cars. We will consider possible public policy approaches to
better protect consumers.
To accomplish this objective, we will, in Part I, outline the two cases
used as examples: GM and Toyota. In Part II, we will outline the existing
regulatory scheme starting with the traditional approach of civil liability
and the regulatory scheme adopted by the Vehicle Safety Act implemented
by the NHSTA. We will then discuss the alternative of imposing criminal
liability for what has traditionally been civil tort liability in Part II. In this
section, we will consider the practical limitations in imposing criminal
liability upon corporations: the size of the fines and the use of DPAs.19
Moreover, in this part, we will consider the inadequacy of laws at both the
federal and state levels criminalizing the design and sale of dangerous
products. We will note that despite the widespread belief to the contrary,
prosecution of white-collar criminals is actually quite common but said
prosecution is more prevalent for certain types of crimes and almost
entirely prosecuted in federal court. Therefore, we will argue that there is a
need to add new criminal statutes that federal prosecutors can use in cases
like GM and Toyota. In Part III, we will offer a two-pronged approach.
The first prong is a statutory approach. We propose enactment of a new
federal statute. This statute would, first, impose criminal liability on

18. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Website, Who we are and what we do,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Who+We+Are+and+What+We+Do.
19. We will largely ignore the larger more philosophical question of whether criminal liability can
and should be imposed on the corporate form. See generally, see e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 687, 692 (1997) ( arguing that civil liability should be imposed on the corporate entity with
criminal liability imposed on the individual corporate wrongdoers); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of
Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 (2000); John Hasnas, Where is Felix
Cohen when we Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense and the Moral Responsibilities of Corporations,
19 J.L. & POL’Y 55, 76 (2010) (arguing that “it is impossible to punish a corporation”).
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individual corporate executives. This approach is not novel. Others have
advocated for this and we do not argue with this as a partial solution.20 It
is, however, insufficient. This approach ignores the difficulty in finding
identifiable wrongdoers in the corporate environment. Moreover, and more
importantly, it ignores the culpability of the corporate entity and the effect
of corporate culture on the individual decision-maker.21 In our proposed
statute we also argue for corporate criminal liability. Several federal
statutes were proposed in the aftermath of the GM/Toyota cases, but these
statutes basically required early warning and increased the penalties for
failure to warn. We see these statutes as a laudable first step but
insufficient. Because the size of the fines, while appearing to be large, are
typically seen as a cost of doing business by corporate criminal defendants,
we call for a more severe sanction. If a corporation has been found guilty
of manufacturing and marketing an automobile that it knows is defective
and the defect causes death or serious injury, we believe that company
should lose its license to do business for a specified period and should
suffer debarment for a specified period.22 This is a type of corporate
incapacitation.
In a case involving a corporation that knowingly sells a product that
causes a substantial number of deaths and injuries, we advocate a more
severe level of corporate incapacitation: permanent loss of a business
license or permanent revocation of the corporate charter. The latter step
would effectively be a corporate death penalty. Moreover, because most
white-collar criminals are prosecuted in federal court rather than state
court, we propose a federal law that would impose both individual and
criminal liability and would specify the punishments we advocate. The
20. Others have argued for prosecution under existing state laws (e.g., negligent homicide). As we
will discuss infra, however, prosecution in state courts is unusual for a variety of reasons including
doing so would take enormous resources and there are political reasons at the local level to ignore these
cases. See infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
21. For example, Toyota’s culture in the time leading up to the sudden acceleration cases has been
described as a “corporate culture of secrecy.” See Joel Finch, Toyota Sudden Acceleration: A Case
Study of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Recalls for Change, 22 LOY. CONS. L.
REV. 472, 474 (2010).
22. It is already illegal for an automobile manufacturer to sell cars that are not compliant with
current federal safety standards. 49 C.F.R. § 573.11 (2010); 49 U.S.C. § 30112 (2010). We are
proposing extending this prohibition to all vehicles manufactured by manufacturers who sell vehicles
that they know are defective and likely to cause death or personal injury. At least one other scholar has
proposed something similar. Finch advocated for what the termed a “tiered probationary system.” See
Finch, supra note 21, at 494 (“Congress should work with the NHSTA to develop a probationary
system for automobile manufacturers. Such a system would rate each automaker’s track record with
safety standards compliance and defects. A tiered system would serve as a reward to companies who
comply in good faith and a deterrent for those who fail to meet safety standards and take appropriate
precautionary measures for defects”). Moreover, Finch advocated for the probationary period to be
assessed by the NHSTA. By contrast, we are proposing that the period be imposed as a sanction against
manufacturers who have been found criminally liable.
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second prong of our approach involves implementation. Because there is
reason to believe that even with additional statutory tools federal
prosecutors may not vigorously pursue criminal cases against corporate
defendants, we will urge policy changes in the DOJ regarding such cases.23

I. FAILURE OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM: TWO CASE STUDIES
A. TOYOTA AND SUDDEN ACCELERATION
As early as 2000, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) began receiving complaints of sudden acceleration in certain
Toyota models.24 Toyota first blamed their customers, arguing that
confused drivers had inadvertently stepped on the accelerator rather than
the brake pedals. In August 2009, a famous 911 call alerted the public to a
problem with Toyota vehicles.25 Toyota then blamed the problem on
improperly installed floor mats.26
In late 2009, Toyota finally
acknowledged that the problem was larger than defectively installed floor
mats. Later that year, the company recalled eight of its U.S. models for
“floor mat entrapment susceptibility” and assured the public that the “root
cause” of the unintended acceleration problem had been addressed.27
Unfortunately, this was not true. Toyota had conducted internal tests that
revealed that not all affected cars had been recalled and that there was a
second cause of unintended acceleration—the sticky accelerator pedal
problem.28 By 2007, Toyota had received a series of reports alleging
unintended acceleration and opened an internal defect investigation.
Throughout 2007, Toyota denied the need for a recall even though their
internal testing revealed that some of their models had design features that

23. This refers to the reluctance of federal prosecutors to go after white-collar and corporate
defendants because of their fear that it may hurt their win-loss record, etc. and the need for a policy
change regarding annual review for raises and promotion. See e.g., JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKEN SHIT
CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017).
24. Suzanne M. Kirchhoff & David Randall Peterman, Cong. Research Serv., RLR41205,
UNINTENDED ACCELERATION IN PASSENGER VEHICLES 1 (2010). In that same year, Toyota issued a
limited recall of 10,000 Lexus models sold in England. Finch, supra note 21, at 475.
25. Statement of Facts (2014). Deferred Prosecution Agreement, accessed at http://www.jus
tice.gov/opa/documents/toyota-stmt-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7JH-MMXA] [hereinafter Statement
of Facts Toyota], at ¶ 9.
26. Finch, supra note 21, at 476-77. Toyota insisted that there was “no evidence to support any
other conclusion.” Finch, id. (citing Bill Vlassic et al., Toyota’s Slow Awakening to a Deadly Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009). Toyota went so far as to issue a press release claiming that the NHTSA had
determined “that a defect exists in vehicles in which the driver’s floor mat is compatible with the
vehicle and properly secured.” Finch, id., at 477.
27. In 2009, Toyota argued that the problem with the acceleration pedal, not the floor mat. Finch,
supra note 21, at 477.
28. Statement of Facts Toyota, supra note 25, at ¶ 10.
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made floor mat entrapment likely.29 In September 2007, Toyota negotiated
a limited recall and touted this as a major victory via internal emails: “had
the agency. . . pushed for recall of the throttle pedal assembly (for
instance), we would be looking at upwards of $100 million+ in unnecessary
costs.”30 Shortly after the limited recall, Toyota engineers revised Toyota’s
internal guidelines in a manner that would make floor mat entrapment less
likely. It was decided, however, to only apply the new guidelines when the
model received a full model redesign which occurred every three to five
years. It was not until 2010 that Toyota acknowledged the full extent of
the problem. On January 21, 2010, Toyota issued another recall asserting
that the sudden acceleration problem was caused by “abnormal friction” in
defective accelerator pedals (“sticky pedals”).31
Sudden acceleration resulted in at least eighty-nine deaths since the
2002 model year32 (more than all other manufacturers combined)33 and
Toyota faced over 400 wrongful death and injury lawsuits. In addition to
the $1.2 billion the firm agreed to pay as part of the DPA, Toyota also
faced civil penalties of more than $66 million.34
B. GENERAL MOTORS AND THE IGNITION SWITCH
GM began developing a new ignition switch in the late 1990s.35 GM
provided specifications to its supplier with respect to the torque needed to
turn the key in the ignition.36 The switch “failed miserably” in early testing
and was redesigned.37 Although the new switch failed to meet GM’s
specifications, it was approved by GM engineer Raymond DeGiorgio.38 In

29. Id. at ¶18.
30. Id. at ¶ 19.
31. Finch, supra note 21, at 478.
32. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 445 (citing NHTSA statistics); Finch, supra note 21.
33. The death toll is reported to be more than double the amount of all other manufacturers
combined. Finch, supra note 21, at 476.
34. DOJ Press Release, supra note 8.
35. Valukas Report 25, 34 (May 29, 2014). Report to the Board of Directors of General Motors
Corporation regarding ignition switch recalls, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/06/05/busi
ness/06gm-report-doc.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T68D-C35N].
36. If the key turned too easily, the ignition could easily be moved from the “run” to the
“accessory” position. This would result in the car’s power being shut off and the disablement of the
car’s airbags. Valukas Report, id., at 3540.
37. Id. at 42.
38. Id. at 39, 40. DeGiorgio was given a choice by the supplier. He could “do nothing or elect to
change the Ignition Switch to solve the problem of low torque, which might, however, cause electrical
problems and would cause delay in getting the Ignition Switch into production.” Id. at 47. He chose to
do nothing. Arguably, DeGiorgio is the chief villain in this story. It seems likely that he could be found
liable as an individual. See infra note 147 and accompanying text where the possibility of individual
criminal liability is discussed. This would not, however, preclude corporate criminal liability. See infra
notes 156-163 and accompanying text where this option is discussed.
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2002, GM began manufacturing cars with the defective ignition switch39.
The defect was such that drivers could inadvertently turn the ignition
switch from the “run” to the “accessory” position.40 This resulted in
vehicle stalls while moving, loss of vehicle power and prevented
deployment of airbags in the event of a crash.41 This caused the driver to
lose control of the power steering and power brakes.42 By some estimates,
the defective ignition switch resulted in more than 100 deaths.43 The
problems with the switch were known by the engineers at GM as early as
2002, but nothing was done to address the problems.44 In fact, certain
engineers knew of the problem before the affected cars went into
production in 2002 but nevertheless approved production.45
In 2004, GM customers began reporting problems with sudden stalls
and engine shut-offs. GM determined that the problem did not pose a
safety concern and decided against any changes.46 They rejected an
improvement to the head of the key that would have significantly reduced
the likelihood of an unexpected shut-off at the cost of less than one dollar
per car.47 Instead, they issued a statement acknowledging the problem but
adding that GM did not believe that this posed a safety issue.48 In February
2005, GM notified their dealers of the issue. They urged dealers to notify
their customers of the potential for a moving stall and to advise consumers
to “remove unessential items from their key chain[s].49 At the same time,
the Current Production Improvement Team concluded that there was “no

39. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 54.
40. Bernard W. Bell, Recalling the Lawyers: The NHTSA, GM, and the Chevrolet Cobalt, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2016).
41. Valukas Report, supra note 35.
42. Statement of Facts (2014). Deferred Prosecution Agreement, accessed at http://www.
justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/772301/download [hereinafter Statement of Facts GM], at ¶ 4.
43. Maggie McGrath, General Motors recalls another 7 million vehicles, some dating back to
1997. FORBES, (June 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/06/30/generalmotorsrecalls-another-7-million-vehicles-some-dating-back-to-1997
[https://perma.cc/475R-332R].
GM acknowledged 15 deaths as a result of the ignition switch defect. Statement of Facts GM, supra
note 41, at ¶ 4.
44. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 1.
45. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 5.
46. At that time, Current Production Improvement Team classified the problem as a Level 3 (or
“moderate”) problem that could be addressed at the next dealership visit. Valukas Report, supra note
35, at 63-64. Because the problem was defined as a “customer convenience issue” rather than a safety
issue, cost considerations were considered when evaluating possible solutions. Valukas Report, id. at 2.
See also id. at 54 (“Complaints of ignition shut-offs and moving stalls were classified as non-safety
issues; that classification was not revisited even as new complaints surfaced; and resolution of the
issues remained mired in cost and ‘business case’ justifications – factors that would have played no role
in resolving a safety issue”).
47. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 67.
48. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 6.
49. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 92.
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acceptable business case”50 for fixing the ignition switch problem. In 2006,
DeGiorgio approved a change to the ignition switch designed to increase
the torque needed to turn the key. He failed, however, to create a unique
part number for the modified switch and did not advise others of the
change.51
Because of the number of complaints, in 2011, GM in-house lawyers
met with GM engineers and asked that an investigation be undertaken by
the GM Product Investigation unit. The investigation was slow moving;
the lead investigator continually disregarded reports. By Spring 2012,
however, it was clear to GM personnel that the ignition switch problem did
pose a safety issue because it could prevent the airbag from deploying in
the case of an accident. It was not until April 2013 that GM investigators
discovered that the design of the ignition switch had been changed in 2006.
Despite this knowledge,52 it was not until February 2014 that GM notified
the NHTSA and the public of the incidents and began an initial recall of
700,000 vehicles.53 GM admitted that the defective switch problem was
not handled in the normal way; instead steps were taken to delay the recall
until they could package and explain the issue. During this time frame,
GM assured the NHTSA that they were acting promptly and in accordance
with their formal recall process.54 Moreover, during this time frame, GM
touted the reliability and safety of its cars to the public. Although it sold no
new cars during this time frame, it sold pre-owned cars accompanied by
certificates assuring customers that all components met safety standards. In
total, GM recalled 40 million cars,55 set up a compensation fund promising
more than $1 million per victim and set aside $2.5 billion for this fund.
The Toyota and GM cases offer two examples of automobile safety
failures. We have a regulatory system that is designed to protect the public
from such failures and to assure automobile safety. In Part II, we will
outline the basic provisions of this regulatory scheme.

50. To present an acceptable business case, a solution had to solve the issue, meet the cost
considerations and have sufficient lead time to implement. Id. at 69.
51. Id. at 98, 100-102. This is a highly unusual practice. It made it difficult for investigators,
including GM engineers and plaintiff lawyers, to identify the cause of the problem.
52. Valukas refers to this as a “bombshell.” Id. at 11.
53. Statement of Facts GM, supra note 41, at ¶ 8.
54. Id., at ¶ 9.
55. AP (2014). New recalls and questions about auto parts safety, accessed at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/new-recalls-and-questions-about-auto-parts-safety/2014/07/01/117
deb24-00ee-11e4-b203-f4b4c664cccf_story.htm.
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II. THE CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME
A. CIVIL LIABILITY
Consumers rely on car manufacturers to design, market and sell safe
cars. There are sound public policy reasons why we expect manufacturers
to ensure that the products they sell are reasonably safe. It is necessary to a
smooth functioning of the economy and necessary to protect consumers.
To accomplish these goals, products liability law is typically designed to
serve the goals of compensation, deterrence and in some cases retribution.
When manufacturers instead offer for sale defective products, the law
typically responds by allowing the injured consumer recourse—he/she can
sue the company for civil liability and recover damages for his/her injury.56
As early as the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company57
courts recognized a duty on the part of manufacturers of products to protect
the users of such products from injury. In the now famous language, Judge
Cardozo held:
We hold, then, that the principle of [inherent danger] is not
limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things
which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place
life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger. Its nature gives warning of the consequences to be
expected. If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser,
and used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully.58
In so holding, the court made clear that negligent manufacturers were
liable to people who are affected by their product without the defense of
privity. In the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,59 the
court made clear that lack of privity was no longer a defense. In 1963, in
the case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,60 the California Supreme
Court first articulated the theory of strict liability, imposing liability on a
manufacturer of a defective product without a showing of negligence.
Judge Traynor held that:

56. See, e.g., Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, A Catalyst for Safety: Americans Can
Thank Products Liability Litigation for Helping to Make Their Cars, Drugs, and Other Products Safer
than Ever. But there is still work to be done., 45-NOV. TRIAL 32 (2009).
57. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
58. Id. at 389.
59. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (N.Y. 1960).
60. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
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To establish the manufacture’s liability, it was sufficient that
the plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the [product]
in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in the
design and manufacture of which the plaintiff was not aware that
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.61
Thus, civil liability emerged as the traditional method of assuring
automobile safety and of compensating plaintiffs when they are injured by
unsafe vehicles.
Civil liability, however, is inadequate for several reasons. First, it
should be noted that the evolution of products liability law from
Winterbottom v. Wright,62 where the court upheld a strict privity standard,
to the Greenman case discussed above, was one of expanding options for
plaintiffs. In other words, the law was making it easier for plaintiffs to sue
manufacturers of defective products. The result was that the number of
product liability lawsuits increased significantly especially during the
1960s and 1970s.63 To some extent, this changed in the 1980s. During this
period, the success rate of such lawsuits decreased.64 In response to cries
for tort reform, states imposed caps on pain and suffering, limited punitive
damages and the federal Class Action Fairness Act made it more difficult
for plaintiffs to bring class actions.65
Second, to some extent criminal and civil liabilities serve different
public policy goals. Both criminal law and civil law aim “to shape
people’s conduct along lines that are beneficial to society.”66 They do this,
however, in different ways. Civil liability is largely compensatory. Civil
damages are awarded to, as much as possible, put the injured plaintiff back
in the position he/she was in prior to the injury. Civil damages also serve a
deterrent function. It is believed that people will act carefully to avoid
paying civil damages.67 By contrast, criminal law acts as a vehicle to

61. 59 Cal. 2d, at 64.
62. Winterbottom v. Wright, 20 Meeson & Welsby 109 (Exchequer of Pleas [England] 1842).
63. Ezroj, supra note 1.
64. Ezroj, supra note 1, at 470.
65. See e.g., Conor Dwyer Reynolds, The Role of Private Litigation in the Automobile Recall
Process, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 121, 158160 (2016) (describing the effect that caps on
noneconomic damages have on the likelihood of a products liability filing).
66. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 12 (2d ed. 2003). See also R. A. Nagareda,
Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (1998)
(“Both tort and criminal law take as a significant objective the prevention of socially undesirable
conduct.”).
67. See e.g. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. A (1998) (“On the premise
that tort law serves the instrumental function of creating safety incentives, imposing strict liability on
manufacturers … encourages greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-based
liability … The emphasis is on creating incentives for manufacturers to achieve optimal levels of safety
in designing and marketing products.”).
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punish wrongdoers.68 Thus, civil damages compensate the plaintiff but are
inadequate to punish the defendant; they perform limited deterrent
functions and are not designed to rehabilitate the defendants. In other
words, civil law fails to punish automobile manufacturers for designing and
marketing dangerous vehicles.
This ignores the role that punitive damages play in civil liability.69
Punitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant when his conduct is
particularly egregious.70 The question becomes whether punitive damages
adequately serve the retribution function.71 Awarding punitive damages
has become increasingly difficult. Punitive damage awards are rare and
typically small.72 In addition, in many jurisdictions there are caps on
awarding punitive damages enacted as part of tort reform, including
Alabama’s code.73 Moreover, the Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,74 supported limiting the amount of
punitive damages by placing a cap on the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages.75 In this landscape, arguably, punitive damages
are inadequate punishment.

68. As will be discussed below, criminal law also serves deterrent and rehabilitative functions. See
infra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
69. See generally Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as
Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009).
70. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996) (“Punitive damages may properly be
imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition”). See also Benjamin J. McMichael, Constitutional Limitations on Punitive Damages:
Ambiguous Effects and Inconsistent Justifications, 66 VAND. L. REV. 961, 962 (2013) (describing
punitive damages as intended to “punish reprehensible conduct and to deter future bad acts”). Punitive
damages also serve a deterrent function. Paul B. Taylor, Encouraging Product Safety Testing by
Applying the Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis when Punitive Damages are Sought, 16 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 769, 771 (1993) (“punitive damages are generally justified on the grounds that they provide
an added penalty that deters defendants from causing future harm”).
71. See Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts: A Descriptive
Theory, 73 TENN. L. REV. 177, 225–28 (2006).
72. Frank J. Vandall, Should Manufacturers and Sellers of Lethal Products be Subject to Criminal
Prosecution?, 17 WIDENER L.J. 877, 890 (2008) (“They occur in three percent of cases and usually
range from $30,000 to $40,000”).
73. See American Tort Reform Association, http://www.atra.org/issues/punitive-damages-reform
[https://perma.cc/QYZ7-BKTW] (providing an overview of state statutes on punitive damages).
74. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
75. Rather than set an absolute cap, the court made clear that the most relevant factor in
determining the appropriate ratio was the degree of reprehensibility. Id. at 418–19. However, it is clear
punitive damage awards that are greater than single digits will likely not pass constitutional muster. Id.
at 425.
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B. THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
The failure of civil law as an adequate remedy lead to the creation of
NHTSA.76 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
(“Vehicle Safety Act”)77 created the NHTSA and charged it with the task of
reducing deaths and injuries stemming from automobile crashes. To
accomplish this objective, the NHTSA was given the power to set motor
vehicle safety standards and conduct safety research.78 The agency can
promulgate federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS) to set
minimum performance standards for vehicle components that affect the
safe operation of the vehicle (e.g., brakes, tires) and those that protect
drivers and passengers in the event of an accident (e.g., seat belts,
airbags).79 These standards need only be “practicable,” stated in “objective
terms” and “meet the need for motor vehicle safety.”80 Moreover, the
agency has the power to recall defective vehicles.81
Each year, the NHTSA receives over 30,000 complaints from
consumers who believe that their car is defective or fails to meet a
FMVSS.82 Car manufacturers are required to notify the NHTSA of any
“defect. . . related to motor vehicle safety”83 and to remedy any such
defects without charge to the consumer.84 Such notification must be
submitted within a reasonable period of time after a defect in a vehicle has

76. Government safety regulation has been credited with serving in parallel with tort liability. See
e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Dialogue with the Designers: Comparative Influences on Products Design
Norms Imposed by Regulators and by the Third Restatement of Products Liability, 26 N. KY. L. REV.
655, 655 (1999) (“The common law tort system and the government safety regulation system serve as
parallel and protective deterrents, encouraging safer design of products.”).
77. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30169 (2012)). See Reynolds, supra note 64, at
124 where he terms the Vehicle Safety Act as the “bedrock of the auto safety regulatory regime”).
78. Finch, supra note 21, at 484; Haroon H. Hamid, The NHTSA’s Evaluation of Automobile Safety
Systems: Active or Passive?, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 227, 230 (2007).
79. Ezroj, supra note 1, at 474-75. Kevin M. McDonald, Don’t tread on me: Faster than a tire
blowout, Congress passes wide-sweeping legislation that treads on thirty-five year old Motor Vehicle
Safety Act, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2001). The NHTSA primarily fulfills its mandate through the
use of recalls rather than by promulgating safety standards. For example, the FMVSS do not address
any of the specific systems that failed in the case of GM’s ignition switch. They do not impose
requirements with respect to ignition switches, stalls, airbag deployment, or power steering systems.
Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 30.
80. Jerry L. Marshaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and
Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 176 (2015).
81. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,118-20 (A)(2012).
82. Finch, supra note 21, at 484. Despite the large number of complaints, it is estimated that
vehicle failure accounts for approximately 2.4% of accidents. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 79, at 178
(citing a study conducted by the NHTSA). However, recall the number of injuries and deaths from
automobile accidents each year. In 2015 alone, there were 6,296,000 accidents accounting for
2,443,000 injuries and 25,000 deaths. NHTSA Statistics, supra note 2.
83. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118 (c)(1) (2012).
84. McDonald, supra note 78, at 1166.
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been determined to be safety related. A defect is defined as a “defect in
performance, construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment.”85 Moreover, such defect is deemed to be safetyrelated if it presents “an unreasonable risk of accidents.”86 If a
“significant” number of vehicles in a class of vehicles has failed in the
normal operation of the vehicle, there is said to be a defect in that class of
vehicle.87 Once the Secretary of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
determines that certain vehicles contain either a product related defect or
fail to meet a FMVSS, the Secretary may order remedial measures.88 The
DOT is given broad powers to investigate and manufacturers are required
to maintain information and produce it when requested,89 and can be
compelled to answer questions under oath.90 If the Secretary determines
that there is a violation, he may refer the matter to the Attorney General
who may bring an enforcement action to recover civil penalties and/or
injunctive relief.91
In 2000, the Vehicle Safety Act was amended by the Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act (TREAD).
In large part, TREAD was a response to perceived deficiencies in the way
the NHTSA handled the Ford/Firestone events of the late 1990s.92 TREAD
was intended to “improve and strengthen the Secretary’s ability to detect
and investigate defects.”93 In addition to increased reporting requirements,
TREAD increased the civil penalties from $1000 to $5000 for each
violation and increased the penalties for a series of violations from
$800,000 to $15 million.94 Moreover, TREAD provided for criminal
penalties where a person violated the reporting requirements with the
intention of misleading the NHTSA with regards to safety-related defects
that have caused death or serious bodily harm.95 Note that the increased
penalties are for failure to comply with the notice and reporting
requirements imposed by TREAD; neither civil nor criminal penalties are
imposed by TREAD for marketing a dangerous car.
Unfortunately, NHTSA is also inadequate for several reasons. While

85. 49 U.S.C. § 30102 (a)(2)(1994).
86. See id. § 30102(a)(8).
87. McDonald, supra note 79, at 1168.
88. 49 U.S.C. § 30118 (b)(2) (1994).
89. Id. § 30166(c).
90. Id. § 30166(f).
91. Id. § 30163.
92. See generally McDonald, supra note 79, for a discussion of the Ford/Firestone event and
subsequent adoption of the TREAD Act.
93. S. Rep. No. 106-423, at 1 (2000).
94. Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 5 (a), 114 Stat. 1800, 1803-04 (2000) (codified at 49 U.S. C. §§
30165(a) (2012)(civil penalties).
95. Id. at § 30170.

DOWELLISWITHTRACKCHANGESLASTMINUTE_11.19%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2019

CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS VEHICLES

12/13/2018 10:42 AM

15

the NHTSA sets standards with respect to automobile safety, it does not
review car designs or products to assure that the cars are safe. In the early
years of NHTSA history, the agency attempted to impose performance
standards upon the industry. This was met with political and judicial
opposition. After this early attempt at dictating safety standards, the
agency, instead embraced the recall as the primary way in which it acts to
achieve its mission.96 If a car is found to pose an unreasonable threat to
vehicle safety, the NHTSA orders a product recall.97 In the years 1966
through 1999, there were 7200 recalls involving over 259 million vehicles;
the majority which were voluntarily initiated by manufacturers.98 In 2014,
automobile manufacturers recalled 64 million vehicles.99 GM itself had to
recall over 40 million cars.100 This approach to product safety does little to
assure that the vehicles sold are safe. In fact, the sheer number of recalls
provides some evidence that they are not.101 Moreover, the sheer volume of
deaths and injuries from automobile accidents should give us pause.
The NHTSA fails to adequately protect consumers and ensure
automobile safety for several reasons.102 First, they lack sufficient legal

96. Mashaw and Harfst describe three phases of NHTSA regulatory emphasis. Initially, the
NHTSA engaged in rule-making in which they issued performance standards. The agency then
switched its focus to recalls. As Mashaw and Harfst describe it the agency has now engaged in rulemaking once more. But, the focus of rule-making is not on dictating performance standards. Instead, it
seeks to encourage the “diffusion of safety technologies the industry [is] already incorporating, or
planning to incorporate, … in nearly all of new vehicles.” Marshaw & Harfst, supra note 80, at 172.
Moreover, the regulations set forth by the NHTSA can best be characterized as “minimal in nature.”
Robinson & Calcagnie, supra note 56, at 33.
97. See Ezroj, supra note 1, at 476-79 (outlining the recall process). See also Reynolds, supra note
64, at 124 where he concludes that most recalls “were preceded by defect-related litigation.”
98. McDonald, supra note 78, at 1170. See McDonald at 1169-70 (detailing the rise in the number
of recalls.) He opines that while there is no single cause to explain the increase in recalls, it might be in
part due to the pressure to increase production to meet demand and the proliferation of new models.
Automobile manufacturer action and NHTSA response to accidents and deaths caused by distracted
driving provides an illustration of this approach. Rather than mandate a technological solution (plug-in
devices that disable cell phone use while the car is moving), the NHTSA has mounted a public relations
campaign to discourage distracted driving. See Mashaw & Harfst, infra note 100, at 264-66 discussing
NHTSA initiatives.
99. This figure is about 45 percent of all passenger cars registered in 2012! Steinzor, supra note 4,
at 443. See also Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 82, at 173 (“[I]n recent years, NHTSA has recalled more
vehicles than are sold new in the United States”).
100. AP, supra note 55.
101. Mashaw and Harfst conclude that the “NHTSA is now predominately a provider of consumer
safety information …, an enforcer of implied warranties (product recalls), a codifier of industry
practice, a broker of voluntary agreements, and a promotor of best practices and guidelines.” Mashaw
& Harfst, supra note 80, at 172. They conclude, “we are doubtful that a strategy based increasingly ion
information provision and voluntary commitments from industry will meet the need for automobile
safety envisioned by the 1966 Motor Vehicle Safety Act.” Id. at 261.
102. See Steinzor, supra note 4, at 445446 (“Although the regulatory system was intended to
prevent such deadly outcomes, it has failed, and will continue to be dysfunctional until Congress gives
NHTSA significantly stronger legal authority and much more money”). See also id. at 446 (“The
agency’s bewildered, even feckless responses to Toyota’s sudden acceleration problems, GM’s
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authority. As noted above, their primary recourse is the recall which is
typically voluntary. They lack authority to require that automobile
manufactures use safe designs. Professors Marshaw and Harfst, in their
seminal work The Struggle for Auto Safety,103 describe how early in the
history of the NHTSA, the agency ceded the option of writing preventative
rules and instead adopted the recall as the primary enforcement
mechanism.104 Most of the recalls are voluntary, the result of extensive
negotiations between the auto manufacturer and the NHTSA.105 In
addition, civil penalties are capped at $105 million for late reporting of
defects.106
Second, they lack sufficient resources. Their entire budget was $830
million for fiscal year 2015.107 Most of their budget is spent on public
relations campaigns against drunk driving (and now distracted driving);
little, if any, of this money is spent on assuring safe designs.108 The Office
of Defects Investigation, had a staff of only fifty-one people in 2014.109
Moreover, arguably, they lack expertise.110 NHTSA response to the
Toyota sudden acceleration case provides a useful example. Instead of
working internally to determine the cause of the sudden acceleration
(whether it was the floor mats, the sticky acceleration pedal or a more
serious problem with the car’s computer system), the NHTSA referred the
question to NASA.111 Perhaps this was because there was not a single
electrical or software engineer on the NHTSA staff.112
Third, some argue that they are subject to industry capture and fail to

defective ignition switches, and Takata’s air bag fiasco have brought the agency back to the forefront of
public attention in what can only be described as a disgrace.”).
103. JERRY L. MARSHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990).
104. See also Steinzor, supra note 4, at 447 where she concludes that the NHTSA “shifted instead to
recalls to ameliorate the effects of safety defects rather than trying to forestall them through
preventative rules.” Marshaw and Harfst argue that the shift from a rules-based approach to a recall
strategy “signaled the abandonment of [NHTSA’s] safety mission” (at 167) and a shift from auto safety
regulation to “crime and punishment” (at 111). They conclude that NHTSA changed from a “proactive
technology forcing regulatory agency” to a “complaints bureau and prosecutor’s office.” Id. at 111.
They revisited this work in 2017 and concluded that recalls have “no demonstrable system effect on
motor vehicle safety.” Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 80, at 167.
105. This has led Steinzor to term the NHTSA the “cajoler-in-chief.” Steinzor, supra note 4, at 449.
106. See 49 U.S.C § 30165 (2012).
107. National Highway Safety Traffic Safety Administration, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Overview 8
(2015).
108. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 450.
109. Id.
110. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451 (“[NHTSA] cannot afford to hire adequate technical staff ….”).
See also Reynolds, supra note 65, at 156 (“NHTSA also fails to be an effective investigator because it
does not have the capacity to understand the data it does collect”).
111. Steinzor concludes that this “confirm[s] the worst suspicions that the agency was incompetent
with respect to this central aspect of automobile design and construction.” Steinzor, supra note 4, at
448.
112. Finch, supra note 21, at 489.
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adequately police the industry.113 Professor Steinzor outlines the “steady
migration of NHTSA officials to the far better compensated ranks of the
car companies’ technical and public relations staff” and argues this trend
“cannot help but blunt NHTSA’s regulatory instincts.”114 Clarence Ditlow,
an American automotive safety consumer advocate, describes the
relationship between the NHTSA and the auto industry as “entirely too
cozy. They view their constituency as the auto industry and not the
consumer.”115 Again, the Toyota case offers us a useful example. Rather
than using their subpoena power to obtain Toyota records, officials from
the NHTSA traveled to Japan to meet with Toyota executives. This resulted
in the Toyota lobbying team’s bragging about saving Toyota $100 million
by stalling NHTSA’s efforts to obtain a voluntary recall.116
C. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE MANUFACTURE OR SALE OF
DANGEROUS PRODUCTS
Unfortunately, the scheme outlined above has all too often failed to
bring about an adequate level of automobile safety. The Toyota and GM
cases highlight the need to consider criminal liability for selling dangerous
products, especially when they cause death or serious injury. In fact, there
has been a recent increase in calls for criminal liability, both corporate and
individual, in product liability cases.
1.

Public Policy Objectives of Criminal Law

The public policy objectives of civil and criminal liability overlap to
some extent, but there are important differences. One policy objective of
the criminal law that overlaps with civil law is deterring harmful conduct.
Deterrence may be general or specific. Specific deterrence is aimed at the
specific defendant who committed a crime. A defendant may be punished
for a criminal act to deter him from engaging in that same behavior.
General deterrence is aimed at the whole society. A defendant may be
punished for a criminal act because it deters others from engaging in that
same behavior in the future.117 As we have seen, tort law is intended, in

113. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451.
114. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 451.
115. Eric Lichtblau & Bill Vlasic, Safety Agency Scrutinized as Toyota Recall Grows, N.Y. TIMES,
( Feb. 9, 2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/10/business/10safety.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/YXM9-EJ78].
116. Peter Valdes-Dapena, Toyota: Saved $100 million dodging recall, CNN MONEY (Feb. 22,
2010, 11:46 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2010/02/21/autos/toyota_document/index.htm [https://perma.
cc/F2EX-C7MZ].
117. Marcia Narine, Whistleblowers and Rogues: An Urgent Call for an Affirmative Defense to
Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 54 (2012); Andrew Weissmann, A New
Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1319, 1325 (2007).
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part, to deter injurious behavior,118 which in the context of this article, is
making and selling dangerous vehicles. The regulatory system of recalls
administered by NHTSA likewise is intended, in part, to deter the same
behavior.119 In light of the GM and Toyota cases, it is apparent that the
deterrent effect of both types of law is inadequate. This makes it
appropriate to look to criminal law to provide a significant, additional
deterrent, both specific and general. Arguably, criminal law, with its broad
array of punishments—ranging from minor to severe—should be able to
deter more effectively than either tort law or regulatory law. In a case of
corporate wrongdoing, imposing criminal liability upon the corporation is
designed to deter corporate employees from engaging in misconduct and, at
the same time, provide an incentive for those in positions of power to
properly monitor their subordinates.120
The unique features of the criminal sanction come into view when we
move beyond deterrence. A second public policy goal of criminal law is
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation seeks to change the convicted defendant in
such a way that he will not be inclined to engage in wrongful behavior. In
the corporate context, rehabilitation is based on the belief that imposing
criminal sanctions can encourage a corporation to change its corporate
culture, among other things.121 Here, the focus is on what steps the
corporation can take to insure similar wrongdoing is unlikely to occur in
the future. Most corporations already have compliance programs in place.
Rehabilitation asks the corporation to explore why such programs failed.
In the case of continued or systemic violations despite the presence of a
compliance program, criminal prosecution can mandate or encourage the
type of change needed in corporate culture and, thus, fulfill the
rehabilitative goal of criminal law.
Another public policy goal that sets criminal law apart from civil law
is the ability of the criminal sanction to incapacitate the defendant and
deny him the opportunity to engage in criminal behavior in the future.122 In
the case of an individual, incapacitation is typically accomplished by

118. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
119. The substantial costs of a vehicle recall give manufacturers an incentive to design and
manufacture safe cars in the first place.
120. Deterring agent misconduct has been termed the “enduring policy behind criminally punishing
corporations.” G. R. Skupski, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Workable
Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
253, 268 (2011).
121. Ashley S. Kircher, Corporate Criminal Liability versus Corporate Securities Fraud Liability:
Analyzing the Divergence in Standards of Culpability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157 (2009).
122. GEORGE COLE, CHRISTOPHER SMITH, & CHRISTINA DEJONG, 46668 THE AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (14th ed. 2015). See also, e.g., Owens, E., More Time, Less Crime? Estimating
the Incapacitative Effects of Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551 (2009).
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incarceration.123 Simply put, however inclined a person might be to
commit criminal acts against the public in the future, they cannot do so
while they are locked inside a prison or jail cell. In the case of a corporate
defendant, the conventional view holds that a corporation cannot be
incarcerated. A corporation is an abstract entity and, as such, cannot be put
behind bars. However, imprisonment does not exhaust the possible ways in
which incapacitation can be accomplished with respect to a corporate
offender. There are several other sanctions that are rarely discussed, let
alone imposed, with respect to a corporation. These include suspension of
a business license in a specific state, suspension of the corporate charter,
temporary or permanent debarment of a corporation with respect to
government contracts, and the most serious sanction: revocation of the
corporation charter. Including these sanctions in the array of corporate
punishments will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the criminal law in
dealing with corporations that manufacture and sell dangerous products.
Finally, perhaps the central public policy goal of the criminal law is
retribution.124 Retributive theories justify punishment based on the idea of
just deserts. The defendant deserves to be punished because they
committed a wrongful act, one that was harmful to society. Here, criminal
law provides something that is absent entirely from both tort law and the
regulatory recalls, namely, society’s moral condemnation of the
defendant.125 Some scholars have argued that what sets criminal liability
apart from imposition of civil liability is the “moral scorn and
condemnation that only criminal punishment entails.”126 Criminal penalties
are imposed to express a moral judgment or condemnation about the actors’
conduct.127 This moral condemnation, which sets criminal law apart from
both civil law and regulatory regimes such as the one under the Vehicle
Safety Act, makes it an essential part of the solution to the problem of

123. Some forms of community corrections would also have the effect of incapacitating an offender.
124. Michael Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated
Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1311, 131617 (2000) (viewing the goals of
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation as social or utilitarian goals and, thus, different from the
goal of retribution). See also generally KIP SCHLEGEL, JUST DESERTS FOR CORPORATE CRIMINALS
(1990).
125. Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 4449 (1997).
126. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405
(1958).
127. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of
Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2000) (“[O]nly criminal punishment involves
expressing moral censure and moral condemnation.”); Andrew Weissmann, supra note 116, at 1324
(“Criminal law, after all, is reserved for conduct that we find so repugnant as to warrant the severest
sanction.”). Imposition of punishment upon a corporation can be problematic. To what extent can one
judge the intent, action and voluntariness of a corporate entity? In other words, is the corporate entity
deserving of punishment for the actions of an individual employee?
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dangerous vehicles and the deaths and injuries they cause. Criminal
penalties should be appropriate when the conduct at issue is so
reprehensible that it deserves public retribution.128
In the case of individual wrongdoing, retribution is achieved through a
variety of punishments, including a monetary fine, community corrections,
incarceration, and, for serious crimes, death. In the case of corporate
crime, retribution typically is achieved through assessment of a fine on the
corporation,129 but as suggested above regarding corporate incapacitation,
there are other possible and arguably more effective punishments that can
express society’s moral condemnation.
It is noteworthy that the public policy goals of criminal law, at least
from a traditional perspective, do not include compensation for the victim
of the crime. Criminal penalties may be necessary to promote vehicle
safety, to deter the wrongful conduct, and to punish when that conduct is so
reprehensible that it deserves public retribution. However, when traditional
criminal penalties, including monetary fines, are imposed on a guilty
defendant, the injured victims are not compensated.130 In other words,
Toyota might agree to pay $1.2 billion as a penalty, but none of that money
is earmarked to compensate the victims. Not one penny of that money goes
to pay medical expenses or to compensate for lost wages. We believe that
this shortcoming can be remedied by taking a more contemporary approach
to criminal sanctions.
2.

Individual Criminal Liability
a. Individual Criminal Liability Under State Law131

Most criminal law is state law.132 Most state criminal statutes address
street crime or common crime, but some are aimed at malfeasance in a
business context. While many of these statutes deal with financial crimes,
128. See Patrick Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liability for Injuries and Death, 40 U. KAN. L. REV.
1091, 1095 (1992) (Imposing criminal liability upon corporations “for acts that threaten or adversely
affect the lives of workers and consumers indicates a growing awareness that injuries and deaths
resulting from marketing knowingly defective products and from willful violations of health, safety, and
environmental laws are no different than injuries and deaths produced by violent street crimes.”).
129. Friedman, supra note 19; Kircher, supra note 121.
130. The traditional justification for this is that criminal law protects the public and a criminal
offense is against the public even though there may be an identifiable victim. Of course, a criminal
prosecution and imposing of a criminal sanction did not preclude the victim from seeking compensation
in a civil action against the person who caused the injuries.
131. Because of the limited scope of corporate criminal liability, some have argued for individual
criminal liability in the case of automobile safety. See e.g., Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446
(“[I]ndividuals with the power to establish early warning systems and repair defects quickly must
perceive a personal threat if they do not act”).
132. See Susan R. Klein & Ingrid B. Grobey, Debunking Claims of Over-Federalization of Criminal
Law, 62 EMORY L.J. 1 (2012).
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there are a few state criminal statutes that can be used to impose liability on
individuals employed by corporations and who share responsibility for the
company’s manufacture and sale of dangerous products. Foremost is a
reckless homicide statute. These laws generally make it a crime to
“consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that causes a
death.133 In a prosecution under this statute the issues typically include the
nature of the risk, the defendant’s awareness of the risk, and the nature of
the defendant’s actions considering that risk. Although there has not been
any judicial determination of the facts of either the GM case or the Toyota
case, based on the Valukas report134 it is reasonable to believe that a
prosecutor could make a case for reckless homicide against employees at
various levels in both GM and Toyota.
In addition to reckless homicide, obstruction of justice statutes, which
“protect the integrity of the criminal justice system by imposing criminal
penalties for lying to the government, destroying evidence, or interfering
with witnesses or juries,”135 may be relevant in the GM case, particularly
with respect to the actions of GM’s lawyers. If they had knowledge of the
dangerousness of the ignition switch and “continued to countenance both
their clients’ failure to notify NHTSA and their misleading assurances to
the agency that GM was dealing appropriately with faulty ignition
switches,”136 a prosecutor could make a case for obstruction of justice.
b. Individual Criminal Liability Under Federal Law
Although the scope of federal criminal law is more narrow than state
criminal law, there are some relevant statutes. The federal obstruction of
justice statutes137 are essentially the same as their state counterparts and
would apply under basically the same circumstances. In addition to
possible obstruction of justice, federal mail fraud138 and wire fraud139
statutes are potentially relevant in cases such as GM and Toyota. In fact, in
both the Toyota and GM cases, the DOJ based their case on wire fraud and
the manufacturer’s assertions that the cars were safe when they knew they
were not. These statutes do not impose criminal liability on the
manufacture for sale of dangerous products. Instead, they prohibit the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Steinzor, supra note 4, at 46465.
Valukas Report, supra note 35.
Steinzor, supra note 4, at 464.
Id.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
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“misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.”140 Arguably, these
statutes can be used to prosecute an individual who uses mail or electronic
means to communicate that a vehicle is safe when it is not.
The federal statute that is most directly related to the manufacture or
sale of dangerous automobiles is the TREAD Act.141 Recall that this Act
imposes an affirmative duty on automobile manufacturers to report any
defect to the NHTSA and imposes criminal liability for failure to do so.
Arguably, enactment of the TREAD Act reflects Congress’s judgment that
existing tort law and administrative remedies were inadequate to ensure
automobile safety and needed to be supplemented with an alternative
sanctioning mechanism. Under TREAD, the only basis for individual or
corporate criminal liability is failure to notify. Significantly, it does not
make the manufacture or sale of a dangerous vehicle a federal crime.
Nevertheless, it is plausible that a federal prosecutor could make a case
against some individuals in these two companies for a TREAD Act
violation.
c. Problems with Individual Criminal Liability Under State and
Federal Law
There are several problems with the current state of individual liability
under both state and federal law that significantly undermine their efficacy
in reducing deaths and injuries from dangerous vehicles. First and
foremost, a very significant problem with individual criminal liability is the
absence of any statute that specifically makes the manufacture or sale of a
dangerous product a criminal offense. It is not a crime to design,
manufacture or sell a dangerous vehicleeven with knowledge of the
defect and danger to public safety.142 The only basis for individual criminal
liability under the TREAD Act is failure to notify, but this reporting
violation is very different from the underlying wrongful act of
manufacturing and selling a dangerous vehicle.
Theoretically, an
automobile executive could report to NHTSA that a particular model is
dangerous and then go ahead with marketing that model without being
subject to criminal liability under federal law.
It is noteworthy that the federal criminal code does include statutes
that prohibit placing other types of dangerous products into interstate
commerce or the U.S. mail. Examples include placing adulterated
140. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 3 (1999).
141. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text where this statute is briefly discussed.
142. It might be possible to bring a case based on state negligent homicide laws where one
knowingly markets a dangerous car that leads to death. While Steinzor asserts that there is a “long
tradition of punishing reckless homicide,” few, if any cases can be found where this claim was
successful against an automobile manufacturer. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 446.
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pharmaceuticals into interstate commerce.143 It is also a federal crime to
place child pornography into interstate commerce.144 It is difficult to find a
logical explanation for why Congress would prohibit these items from
interstate commerce but not dangerous vehicles, especially when the risk of
serious harm is known.
An individual could be prosecuted under a state reckless homicide
statute for selling a dangerous vehicle, but such prosecutions are
exceedingly rare. No individuals have been prosecuted under these statutes
in the Toyota or GM cases. An individual could be prosecuted under
federal mail and wire fraud statutes, but no individuals have been
prosecuted under these statutes in the Toyota and GM cases. Similarly, an
individual could be prosecuted under state or federal obstruction of justice
statutes, but no such prosecutions have taken place in the Toyota or GM
cases.
A second problem with using criminal law to attach liability to
individual wrongdoers involves identifying those individual wrongdoers in
the corporate setting. Traditionally, the criminal sanction has been limited
to wrongful conduct that is egregious, that is, conduct most deserving of
moral condemnation by society. Defendants are punished for intentionally
engaging in wrongful behavior, knowing or being deliberately indifferent
to the consequences or risks of their actions. This mental state, known as
mens rea or the guilty mind, is an essential element of most crimes.145
Under the concept of mens rea, a defendant who committed a criminal act
in a careless or negligent manner does not deserve to be criminally
punished.146 In a criminal case, the prosecutor must prove that the
defendant had the requisite state of mind at the time he committed the
criminal act. In many cases of white-collar crime this is not problematic.
White-collar crime is successfully prosecuted on a regular basis, especially
in federal court.147 In some organizational settings, however, with
extensive specialization of labor,148 it is not uncommon for decision making
to be widely dispersed and be separated from the task or tasks of carrying
out the decision. Often, those who carry out a decision are not the same

143. 21 U.S.C §§ 331, 351 (2012).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012).
145. During the course of the 20th century we can observe the rise of so-called strict liability
crimes. These crimes typically are found in administrative law. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, Criminal Law
§ 5.5 (6th ed. 2017). With respect to the requirement that the criminal act and the mental state must
occur at the same time see id. at § 6.3.
146. The major exception to this is the crime of negligent or reckless homicide.
147. See generally DAVID WEISBURD, STANTON WHEELER, ELIN WARING, & NANCY BODE,
CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1991).
148. Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629 (2002).
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individuals who make the decision. From a legal perspective, this can have
the effect of separating the criminal act from the state of mind—the mens
rea. In an organizational setting, it is not unusual to have the individual
who engaged in the criminal action lack the intent (or knowledge) needed
to hold them criminally liable. Similarly, the individual with the intent (or
knowledge) of the wrongfulness of the action may not be the person who
carried out the act. Moreover, in an organizational setting the decision
making may be widely dispersed so that it is difficult to find an individual
who made the decision.149 In the GM case, the Valukas Report
acknowledged that it was almost impossible to identify actual decision
makers involved in the ignition switch design.150 The result in such a case
is that it may be exceedingly difficult for the prosecutor to hold any
individual in the organization criminally responsible.
Third, the extent to which imposing criminal liability upon individual
corporate executives creates a sufficient deterrence to some extent depends
upon several factors. Deterrence of individual wrongdoing is not
problematic in theory. Large fines should deter, except for the very
wealthy. In that case, incarceration, even for a short period of time, should
provide adequate deterrence. Social science literature supports this.151
Other, more creative punishments such as community corrections,
attending classes on the environment or other appropriate topic, combined
with fines and a short period of incarceration could also work. For the less
wealthy, large fines should deter, but other punishments, such as short
periods of incarceration or community service, could effectively

149. General Motors identified 15 individuals who were at least partially at fault for the defect and
terminated their employment. Bill Vlasic, G.M. Inquiry Cites Years of Neglect over Fatal Defect, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2014. The Valukas Report faults Ray DeGiorgio, the engineer responsible for the
development and manufacture of switches used by GM in their compact models. Valukas Report, supra
note 35. See also Steinzor, supra note 4, at 455-57 (outlining DeGiorgio’s involvement in a section
entitled “DeGiorgio Goes Under the Bus”). Arguably, these individuals’ actions and mental state might
be enough to satisfy the mens rea requirement. Steinzor argues that certain individuals might have the
requisite knowledge to meet the mens rea requirement. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 459 (“[T]he three
champions should, at the very least, be considered key targets in any such investigation. How much
they knew about why other executives thought the problem demanded the appointment of a champion
and the reasons why they failed to respond to the urgent request that they serve as one could indicate the
kind of willful blindness that can demonstrate mens rea in a criminal case”).
150. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 255
The Cobalt Ignition Switch issue passed through an astonishing number of committees.
We repeatedly heard from witnesses that they flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and
the solution died in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the issue.
But determining the identity of any actual decision-maker was impenetrable. No single
person owned any decision. Indeed, it was often difficult to determine who sat on the
committees or what they considered …
151. See, e.g., Natalie Schell-Busey, Sally S. Simpson, & Melissa Rorie, What Works? A Systematic
Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 387 (2016).
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supplement such fines.152 If there is a problem, it is that sentences are too
lenient. If that is the case, is it due to the attitudes of judges or to
sentencing guidelines, or to insufficient degree and type of punishments
specified in the relevant statutes? If it is the attitudes of the judges, the
sentencing guidelines can be modified or mandatory punishments added to
the statutes. If punishments specified in the statute are too lenient, that can
be remedied by legislation, which will at the same time reduce the judges’
discretion.
A related matter regarding individual liability of corporate executives
is the problem of indemnification. If managers are indemnified for any
amounts of money they must pay as a criminal fine, there is insufficient
deterrent. It is not clear whether indemnification could be legally
prohibited. It is possible, but this problem points to a better solution:
incarceration coupled with community corrections, or other punishments in
which the burden cannot be shifted to others. As much as they might wish
otherwise, a wealthy corporate executive would not be able to send a lowlevel employee to prison in his place.
Fourth, a review of existing laws shows that to some extent a gap in
the law is a contributing factor in the problem of injuries and death caused
by dangerous vehicles. The gap in federal law, which fails to criminalize
the knowing placement of a dangerous vehicle into interstate commerce, is
especially glaring. Repairing this gap by enacting a new federal statute
prohibiting placing dangerous vehicles into interstate commerce will be
discussed below. However, enacting new criminal statutes will not be
adequate to remedy the problem of vehicle safety. The statutes that are on
the books are not being enforced by prosecutors in cases of dangerous
vehicles. Even when there are adequate laws in effect, prosecutions are
very rare. The reasons for this are found in an array of obstacles to
attaching criminal liability.
Given that prosecutors operate in an environment of resource
constraints,153 it is easy to see why a prosecutor may decline to prosecute an
individual in an organizational setting. Not all cases can be prosecuted, so
the limited resources that are available are used to prosecute the cases in
which a conviction is easier to obtain. This is not to suggest that whitecollar crimes are not prosecuted. In fact, the opposite is the case.154 There
are many successful prosecutions of individuals in an organizational
setting. However, it may partially explain why some corporate executives

152. Id.
153. See, e.g. Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, & Relationships: Contextual
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1 (2013).
154. WEISBURD, supra note 147; SCHLEGEL, supra note 124.
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are not prosecuted and why automobile executives have not been
prosecuted. Federal prosecutors typically have more resources at their
disposal than local prosecutors have. Still, they are operating under an
environment of resource constraints. This may push them to focus on cases
that are easier to prosecute and away from corporate executives who are
more difficult to prosecute.
Beyond resource constraints, there may be political and sociological
reasons why prosecutors are reluctant to prosecute corporate executives.155
Local prosecutors throughout the country, with rare exceptions, are elected
officials.156 As such they will inevitably be connected to local politics. The
executives of corporations that have local presence would typically be
politically connected as well. These executives and the prosecutor may
belong to the same political party, belong to the same service organizations
such as Rotary or Kiwanis, and belong to the same social circles and even
be personal friends. Any of these connections may influence a prosecutor’s
decision on whether to prosecute an executive, even though doing so might
entail a conflict of interest.
Even if the local prosecutor has no connection with a corporate
executive, the corporation itself may have a substantial local presence. It
may employ large numbers of local people, have supply chain links with
local vendors, and have a long history of local philanthropy with financial
support of local museums, youth sports teams, as well as local arts and
cultural events. The political fallout of bringing a criminal case against the
executives of such a corporation could make a local prosecutor decide to
devote their limited resources to prosecuting other cases. While federal
prosecutors are appointed and, therefore, may not have the same local
political connections that a county prosecutor has, they may nevertheless be
socially connected with corporate executives, and such connections may
have the same degree of influence on the decision to prosecute that they do

155. Stemen & Frederick, supra note 153. Unfortunately, there is no empirical research on the
question of why federal prosecutors decide to prosecute or not prosecute. RINA STEINZOR, WHY NOT
JAIL? 169 (2015). Two empirical studies on state prosecutors point to lack of resources as a major
factor in the decision to not prosecute. Kenneth A. Ayers Jr. & James Frank, Deciding to Prosecute
White-Collar Crime: A National Survey of State Attorneys General, 4 JUST. Q. 425 (1987); Michael L.
Benson et al, District Attorneys and Corporate Crime: Surveying the Prosecutorial Gatekeepers, 26
CRIMINOLOGY 505 (1988). Jesse Eisinger examines the motivations of United States Department of
Justice attorneys regarding the decision to bring criminal cases against corporate executives. EISINGER,
supra note 23.
156. Prosecution of state criminal cases can be at the local or state level. In three states, the state
attorney general directs all local prosecutions (Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island). In the rest,
prosecutions are handled by local prosecutors almost all of whom are elected officials. GEORGE COLE,
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, & CHRISTINA DEJONG, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38788
(14th ed. 2015).
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with local prosecutors.157
So, we see that local prosecutors may be reluctant to bring a criminal
case because of personal reasons, political reasons, resource constraints, or
legal reasons such as anticipated difficulty with proving mens rea in certain
individuals within an organization. A prosecutor who decides to bring a
criminal case against a corporate executive may fail to obtain a conviction
because of resource constraints or the mens rea problem. These obstacles
must be overcome for individual criminal liability to play a meaningful role
in promoting vehicle safety. Unless this problem is remedied, providing
new statutory tools to prosecutors will have a negligible effect on the
problem.
But even if a prosecutor succeeds in convicting one or more
individuals who committed a crime within an organizational setting,
individual criminal liability is problematic because it lets the corporation
“off the hook.” Organizations are instrumental in shaping the attitudes,
beliefs, perceptions, and behavior of individuals who work in them. In
some situations, they also provide the opportunity and means to commit a
criminal act. As a result, whether an individual is prosecuted for a crime
within an organizational setting and whether or not an individual is
convicted of such a crime, it is essential that the criminal liability of the
organization itself be considered. This will be discussed in the next two
sections.
3.

Corporate Criminal Liability Under State and Federal Law
a. Background

Corporate criminal liability has been an accepted part of American
law for over a century. In the leading case of New York Central and
Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States,158 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that corporations can be responsible for criminal acts committed

157. In his classic study, Jack Peltason discussed the difficult time federal judges in the south
experienced during the school desegregation cases. Arguably, the experience of federal prosecutors
would not be significantly different. JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN
FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1971).
158. N.Y. Cen. & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. U.S. 212 U.S. 481, 495-96 (1909).
We see no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the corporation
which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and officers, shall be
held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents whom it has
entrusted authority to act.
Insulating corporations from criminal liability would “virtually take away the only
means of effectually controlling” corporations and would allow the law to “shut its eyes
to the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times are conducted
through” corporations. Id.
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by their employees. The Court noted that an important justification for this
rule is the need to control corporations, which by that time had acquired
enormous power and the potential for inflicting substantial harm to people,
the economy, and the environment. That potential is much greater today.159
A review of the specific statutes applicable to a corporation shows that
for the most part the same statutes that potentially apply to an individual in
a dangerous product case arguably also apply to a corporation. Under state
law, reckless homicide appears to be especially relevant. As mentioned
above with respect to individual liability, it is reasonable to believe that a
prosecutor could make a case for reckless homicide against both GM and
Toyota. In addition, as in the case of individual liability, a prosecutor may
be able to make a case for obstruction of justice against GM and Toyota for
concealing evidence and misleading state government officials.
With respect to federal criminal statutes, the federal obstruction of
justice statute160 is much more relevant than its state counterparts if GM or
Toyota officials or their lawyers lied to or mislead federal regulators
regarding the safety issues relating to the vehicles. In addition to possible
federal obstruction of justice charges, the federal mail fraud161 and wire
fraud162 statutes are potentially relevant regarding corporate liability. As is
the case with individual liability, these statutes do not impose criminal
liability on a corporation for the manufacture or sale of dangerous products.
Arguably, these statutes can be used prosecute a corporation when its
employee uses mail or electronic means to communicate that a vehicle is
safe when it is not. In fact, federal mail and wire fraud statutes were the
basis of the federal government’s threatened prosecution of Toyota that
resulted in a DPA in 2014.
The federal statute that is most directly related to corporate liability
for the manufacture or sale of dangerous vehicles is the TREAD Act.163 As
in the case of individual liability, the only basis for corporate criminal
liability is failure to notify. It is plausible that a federal prosecutor could
make a case against both GM and Toyota for a TREAD Act violation.164
For nearly as long as the corporate criminal liability doctrine been in
effect it has been the subject of criticism and this criticism continues
today.165 While corporate criminal liability has become widely accepted
159. SCHLEGEL, supra note 124, at 3; WEISBURD, supra note 147, at 172.
160. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (2012).
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
163. See notes 82-87 and accompanying text where we discuss the duty to notify.
164. For example, GM failed to notify the NHTSA within the required time period. Statement of
Facts GM, supra note 42.
165. Nan S. Ellis & Steven B. Dow, Attaching Criminal Liability to Credit Reporting Agencies: Use
of the Corporate Ethos Theory of Criminal Liability, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 167, 176 n.34 (2014).
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among the courts, there has been a contrary view espoused by some
commentators who are arguing essentially for corporate criminal immunity.
For them, this immunity typically rests on the claim that holding a
corporation criminally liable for the acts of its employees is impossible, or
unfair, or both. This claim is supported by a set of arguments that are
flawed at best or simply vacuous.
b. Problems with Corporate Criminal Liability Under State and
Federal Law
1. Gaps in the Law.
Because, for the most part, the same criminal laws that apply to an
individual also apply to a corporation, the same gaps in the statutes that we
saw in the case of an individual defendant are present in the case of a
corporate defendant. In particular, the glaring gap in federal law in the case
of an individual defendant (i.e., federal law does not prohibit selling a car
that is known to be dangerous) persists in the case of a corporate defendant.
There is no federal reckless homicide statute. As in the case of an
individual defendant, the TREAD Act does little to fill the gap because it
punishes only reporting violations.
A company whose employees
knowingly put a dangerous vehicle into interstate commerce can escape
liability under the TREAD Act by simply complying with its reporting
requirements. Clearly, there is a need for a new federal statute that will
give federal prosecutors the necessary tools to respond to cases like GM
and Toyota.
2.

The Mens Rea Problem.

A significant impediment to successfully prosecuting any corporate
defendant is proving mens rea.166 The basic problem is that a corporation is
an abstract legal entity. As such, it is not able to have a state of mind in the
conventional sense. Traditionally, courts have resolved this problem by
looking at the actions and mental state of corporate employees applying the
principle of respondeat superior to find corporate criminal liability.167 Use
of respondeat superior to impose criminal liability upon the corporation

166. See, e.g., Patricia Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 81 (2006).
167. Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law,
19 J. OF LAW & POL’Y 1, 4 (2010); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation:
Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1985).
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has, however, been the target of intense criticism by commentators.168
First, it is argued that the respondeat superior model fails to provide
adequate deterrence. Arguably, under respondeat superior, the corporation
is incentivized to monitor and police its employees to avoid criminal
charges.169 The typical way that corporations act to deter wrongdoing is by
adopting corporate codes of conduct and compliance programs. However,
the existence of these codes and programs will not insulate the corporation
from liability for the actions of an agent in violation of those rules.
Therefore, it is argued that attaching liability under respondeat superior
provides inadequate incentives for corporations to develop, implement, and
enforce effective corporate compliance programs.170
Second, it is argued that the model of respondeat superior fails to
serve any real retributive function. Recall the goal of retribution as a part
of criminal law stems from the belief that it is proper to punish wrongdoers
when their conduct is morally repugnant. The problem in the case of
respondeat superior is obvious; liability is imposed upon the corporation
without finding the corporation morally culpable.171
Third, utilizing the respondeat superior model promotes inconsistent
enforcement by being both under and over-inclusive. Some commentators
have argued that the theory is over-inclusive, giving prosecutors too much
discretion and forcing even innocent corporations to accept responsibility
to avoid prosecution.172 Moreover, the doctrine is over-inclusive because
under respondeat superior, a corporation faces liability for the actions of a
rogue employee even when it has taken all possible steps to prevent
misconduct.173 At the same time, the doctrine is under-inclusive because
oftentimes prosecutors shy away from criminal prosecution to avoid
punishing innocent shareholders and for all the reasons discussed above.
168. See e.g., Ellis & Dow, supra note 165.
169. Skupski, supra note 120, at 268 (describing the “enduring policy behind criminally punishing
corporations” as one of “deterring agent misconduct by allocating risk of criminal liability to the
corporation to incentivize greater control of its agents”).
170. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?, 46 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1437, 1441 (2009) (“[T]his standard provides no incentives for companies to expend resources to
institute effective compliance programs.”); Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking
Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 411, 450 (2007) (criminal corporate liability should only be
imposed upon corporations who fail to have reasonable policies and procedures in place to prevent
employee wrongdoing).
171. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1104 (1991); Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The
DOJ’s Internal Moral – Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7,
10 (2011) (“[T]he current standard allows conviction of corporations when the entity has engaged in no
morally culpable behavior.”).
172. See, e.g., Abril & Olazahal, supra note 166, at 113.
173. Kircher, supra note 121, at 159 (acknowledging that the respondeat superior doctrine fails to
distinguish between crimes that are committed with encouragement of upper management and those
perpetrated by a rogue employee).
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By giving little guidance to prosecutors to determine which corporations to
prosecute, we are left with arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement.
Most importantly, the doctrine of respondeat superior focuses on the
individual actor and, as such, often fails to recognize the role that corporate
culture can play in fostering illegal conduct by its employees.174 In doing
so, it fails to focus on the actual misconduct by the corporation.175
3. The Mens Rea Problem Solved
Theories that impose corporate criminal liability by focusing only on
the individual wrongdoer’s conduct ignore the effect that the organizational
culture can have on whether individuals within that organization are likely
to engage in wrongdoing. Theories that focus on the actions of one
individual fail to recognize that often organizational wrongdoing cannot be
easily traced to action by one individual. GM provides an example of this
difficulty. Although DeGiorgio is one clearly identifiable culpable
individual, other engineers, managers, and lawyers also played a role and it
is impossible to identify exactly who.176 This is true because often
corporate behavior is made up of many small actions by disconnected
individuals which when aggregated become unethical or illegal conduct.177
The corporate ethos theory addresses those shortfalls by emphasizing the
role corporate culture plays.178
Under the corporate ethos theory attention is paid to factors that
comprise corporate culture, imposing liability on a corporation when the
corporate culture created “an environment or a demonstrable personality
that encouraged the violation.”179 The first aspect of corporate culture that
is relevant to identifying the corporate ethos is its hierarchy.180 This aspect

174. James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social and
Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 58 (2009).
175. Skupski, supra note 120, at 277 (“[T]he strict liability effect of the respondeat superior
standard causes a failure to inquire into the genuine culpability of the corporation”).
176. See generally Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 255.
The Cobalt Ignition switch issue passed through an astonishing number of committees.
We repeatedly heard from witnesses that they flagged the issue, proposed a solution, and
the solution died in a committee or with some other ad hoc group exploring the issue.
But determining the identify of any actual decision-maker was impenetrable. No single
person owned any decision. Indeed, it was often difficult to determine who sat on the
committees or what they considered . . .
177. Fanto, supra note 172, at 26 (“[O]rganizational misconduct may also not be easily traceable to
one bad act; rather, it is made up of small decisions or actions that may be at first ethically or legally
equivocal and that are the bases for later decisions or actions that eventually and cumulatively are
clearly unethical and illegal.”).
178. Bucy, supra note 170, at 1099. See also Ellis & Dow, supra note 165 (comparing the
respondeat superior model to the corporate ethos model).
179. Abril & Obazabal, supra note 166, at 123.
180. Bucy, supra note 171.
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recognizes the role that leaders play in shaping corporate culture and
focuses on how the actions of leaders might encourage misconduct. In a
strong organizational culture, the leader should pay attention to the culture
of the corporation. This means, among other things, that the leader should
discuss unethical behavior by employees, punish such behavior and outline
a plan to minimize the likelihood of such behavior occurring again.181
Second, corporate ethos is shaped by corporate goals.182 People are
basically obedient and when told to meet certain goals, the means of
achieving those goals are unimportant; people are likely to achieve those
goals by any means possible. 183 Third, corporate policies, including
training and education programs, are an important factor in shaping the
corporate ethos.184 It is important to note what efforts the corporation has
taken in educating its employees about legal requirements and ethical
expectations. This includes adoption of mission statements, corporate
codes of conduct, and specific training initiatives. However, it is necessary
to consider whether these policies are inculcated into the fiber of the
corporation or are mere posturing. Fourth, the corporate ethos is defined
in part by the monitoring mechanisms including all preventative measures
that the corporation may have in place.185 Related to this, it is, fifth,
important to consider how the corporation responded to allegations of
wrongdoing in the past. How seriously did corporate officials investigate
these allegations? Indifference or denial can be a sign that they have
“recklessly tolerated” the misconduct. It is also important to consider how
corporate leaders responded to allegations of misconduct. Sixth, the
compensation scheme partly defines the corporate ethos. This includes an
analysis of what is rewarded and what is punished. People act in ways that
are rewarded and they act to avoid punishment.186 Just as importantly,
people watch what is rewarded and what is punished in the behavior of
others.

181. Bucy, supra note 170, at 1448.
182. Bucy, supra note 171, at 1133 (“whether the goals set by the corporation promote lawful
behavior or are so unrealistic that they encourage illegal behavior”).
183. See generally Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Crime: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35
RUTGERS L.J. 1 2003 (arguing rewards based on achievement of goals that ignore the way of bringing
about that achievement induce people to work to achieve goals without attention to the ethics or the
legality of the methods used).
184. Bucy, supra note 171, at 1134-35.
185. Kircher, supra note 121, at 172.
186. Linda K. Trevino & K. A. Nelson, Managing Business Ethics: Straight Talk about How to Do
It Right (2014). (Similarly, people will act to avoid punishment. In the corporate setting, perhaps the
most threatening punishment is to be fired. People respond to rewards and incentives and watch how
others are rewarded and punished. It follows that if people are rewarded for “making the numbers” at
all costs, people will act in ways to meet that goal.).
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We can use GM to illustrate. For 77 years, GM sold more cars than
any other car manufacturer worldwide. That ended in 2007 when Toyota
overtook them in worldwide sales.187 In the early 2000’s GM was faced
with sagging sales and unstable profits.188 In 2005, GM lost $10.6
billion.189 In the early 2000’s, GM sought to develop a successful small car
line to compensate for sagging sales in trucks and SUVs.190 The Cobalt,
with the newly designed ignition switch, was GM’s reentry into the small
car game.191 The success of the small car line was important to GM’s
overall financial performance and to its ability to meet federal emission
standards. In fact, GM’s North American Strategy Board had determined
that the success of the Cobalt was essential if GM were to survive.192 It
was produced on slim margins to help meet these objectives.193 Another
way in which GM responded to its fiscal woes was in their attempts to
reduce costs including cutting costs for individual parts and consolidation
of the U.S. Engineering group from 11 centers to one unit.194 The corporate
culture, thus, appeared to be one driven by the goal of increasing car sales
and reducing costs. The launch of the Cobalt was in response to these
goals and it appears that there was pressure to get the car launched in a
timely fashion. Steinzor opines that internal pressures not to delay the
2004 launch date of the Cobalt influenced DeGiorgio’s decision to approve
the ignition switch even though it failed to meet GM’s specifications.195
In its examination of the GM corporate culture, the Valukas Report
discussed what it termed the “tone at the top.” The message from GM
leaders was inconsistent. On the one hand, the message was “when safety
is at issue, cost is irrelevant.” At the same time, a message was conveyed
that “cost is everything.”196 Training materials highlighted safety concerns
and made no mention of cost as a relevant factor.197 However, the 2000’s
were a time of cost-cutting at GM. One engineer was quoted as saying that
the emphasis on cost-cutting “permeates the fabric of the whole culture.”198
187. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 15.
188. Id. at 22.
189. Id. at 23.
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id. at 21.
193. Id. at 22.
194. Id. at 234.
195. Steinzor, supra note 4, at 454 (“But he said nothing as the new car went into production
probably because of internal pressure not to interfere with the 2004 launch date.”).
196. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 249.
197. Id. at 249 (quoting a training presentation “[W]e are competing in a new world, one that
demands a culture where there is not tolerance for defects at any point during in[side] the vehicle
development and manufacturing process. Because the marketplace has zero tolerance for defects, this
organization has no tolerance for defects.”).
198. Id. at 250.
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This cost-cutting mentality impacted all aspects of the business, from
bringing projects in on time, sourcing to the lowest bidder and to cuts in
engineering staff. While the ignition switch issue was presented to GM
senior engineering management, they failed to take immediate action.
Instead, an investigation was opened that lasted two and half years.199
Moreover, the issue of the ignition switch was never raised with upper
management .200 To the extent that management was aware of the issue, it
failed to take a leadership role in in elevating the investigations to a more
urgent level.201
In fact, committee after committee reviewed the problem but no action
was taken.202 The Valukas Report recounts the story of a junior safety
investigation engineer who presented the issue to the committee charged
with reviewing such matters. The committee quickly closed the safety
investigation without taking any action.203 The Valukas Report describes a
culture in which “everyone had responsibility to fix the problem, [but]
nobody took responsibility.”204 The Valukas Report concludes that there
was a “troubling disavowal of responsibility made possible by a
proliferation of committees.”205 It references what was called the “GM
Salute”—where one crossed his arms and pointed outward to others to
indicate that the decision and responsibility belonged to someone else. The
committee had responsibility, but “no single person bore responsibility or
was individually responsible.”206
Corporate culture shapes individual action within the corporation.
Individuals conform to the behavior around them.207 At GM, this
manifested itself in what had been termed the “GM nod” where everyone
nods in agreement to a proposed plan of action but leaves the room and
does nothing.”208 This tendency to conform manifested itself in a more
significant manner when Steven Oakley, a Brand Quality Manager,
classified the inadvertent shut-off as a convenience issue rather than a
safety issue. Oakley recounts how he believed the shut off to be a safety
issue, but the Program Engineering Manager for the team and other

199. Id. at 211.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. The greater the numbers of people who participate in an action the less likely people are to feel
a sense of individual responsibility. John M. Darley, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion
of Responsibility, 8 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377 (1968).
203. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 78.
204. Id. at 2.
205. Id. at 68.
206. Id. at 69, 255 (“No single person owned any decision”).
207. Soloman E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a
Unanimous Majority, PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 70 (1956).
208. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 256.
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engineers told him that it was merely a convenience issue and he “deferred
to them.”209
In addition, people exhibit confirmation bias.210 A fatal example of
this at GM was their unwillingness to reevaluate their conclusion that the
ignition switch defects were a convenience issue rather than a safety
issue.211 GM personnel repeatedly failed to search for information that
might explain the accidents and complaints from consumers. Although
faced with mounting evidence to the contrary, GM engineers and
committee members refused to consider the impacts of moving stalls or to
question the effects upon airbag deployment. 212 It is common for people to
act this way due to escalation of commitment.213 The ignition switch was
problematic from the start. In fact, the engineer who approved the design
called it the “switch from hell.”214 The prototype performed so poorly that
it had to be totally redesigned. Upon completion, the redesigned switch
still failed to meet mechanical specifications for torque. Nevertheless, it
was approved and went into production.
Last, fragmented knowledge within a corporate culture can impact
decision-making. In the case of GM, this aspect of corporate culture was
fatal. When GM engineers began receiving complaints that the low torque
on the ignition switch could lead to moving stalls, they did not recognize
this as a safety issue. This was in part because those engineers did not
know that other engineers had designed the car so that turning the key to
the accessory position would disable the airbags. The Valukas Report
describes the “information silos” where engineers in one department of GM
did not know what engineers in other departments were doing. This which
lead to the delayed response.215
The formal culture at GM is comprised at least in part by policies that
encourage safe design. For example, the expectation is that GM lawyers
who discover a safety issue elevate that issue to their superiors.216
209. Id. at 76.
210. The confirmation trap operates in a way that encourages individuals to look for evidence to
confirm preexisting conclusions and to disregard information that does not support that conclusion.
David M. Messick & Max H. Bazerman, Ethical Leadership and the Psychology of Decision-Making,
SLOAN MGMT. REV., Winter 1996, at 9, 19.
211. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 211.
212. Id. at 256.
213. Moreover, escalation of commitment makes it likely that once started down a path, even a
dangerous path, people are unlikely to change course. Barry M. Staw & Jerry Ross, Understanding
Behavior in Escalation Situations, 246 SCIENCE 216, 216 (1989).
214. Valukas Report, supra note 35, at 5.
215. Id. at 33 (“Had GM personnel connected the dots and understood how their own cars were
built, they might have addressed the safety defect before injuries and fatalities occurred.”).
216. Id. at 109–10 (“If you believe … that the conclusion is wrong, you should continue to seek an
appropriate resolution. It is your duty to bring the situation to the attention of superiors or their
supervisors if necessary.”).
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However, the engineer in charge of the project, Ray DeGiorgio, approved
production of the ignition switch knowing that it failed to comply with
GM’s specifications. Nothing in GM policy prevented him from doing so
and, in fact, it seems likely that no one at GM, other than DeGiorgio, even
knew that the part failed to meet the specification.217 Unfortunately, GM
failed to have sufficient monitoring systems in place to detect or prevent
such action.218 One of GM’s main safety lawyers explained his defense of
the switch saying, that he did not want to be criticized for failing to “defend
a brand new launch.”219 According to the Valukas Report there was a
reluctance to raising issues at GM. When explaining this reluctance some
pointed to their reluctance to do anything that would delay the launch, and
some spoke to a fear of retaliation.220
4. The Spillover Effect.
An argument often raised by those promoting corporate immunity is
the spillover effect, which is sometimes referred to as the innocent
shareholder. Those who raise this argument suggest that it goes to the
issue of fairness. That is, they argue that the spillover effects of a criminal
prosecution make such a prosecution unfair. The argument can be
summarized in the following way. When a corporation is prosecuted
criminally, an array of “innocent” parties is impacted. If the prosecution
causes the value of the company’s shares to fall or the company goes out of
business, this will harm the shareholders who, the argument goes, were not
responsible for the criminal actions and did not have the means to prevent
it. This argument typically implies or specifies that the shareholders are a
retired couple whose income depends in significant part on their
investments. Not only will the shareholders be harmed, the company’s
employees, the employees’ families, and suppliers will also suffer. Hence,
it is argued that prosecuting any corporation is unfair.
To be sure, there are collateral consequences to any criminal
prosecution.221 However, as a justification for corporate immunity, the
spillover effect argument completely fails. It fails because when logically
applied in the broader context of individual criminal defendants, we see
217. Id. at 52.
218. Id. at 34 (“‘[W]hile the decision to change the Ignition Switch, without changing the part
number, violated GM’s policies, GM also failed to have in place an oversight system sufficient to
ensure such decisions were reviewed and the correct decisions made.”).
219. Id. at 7.
220. Id. at 252.
221. See, e.g., Steven B. Dow, Navigating Through the Problem of Mootness in Corrections
Litigation, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 651, 662–65 (2015); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson,
The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017).
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that it is completely vacuous. Virtually all criminal prosecutions will have
some spillover effects. The people hurt by such a prosecution are often far
more innocent than corporate shareholders. When an individual is
convicted of a crime and sent to prison there is a profound negative impact
on his/her family. Financial and other kinds of support that the defendant
was providing to the family disappears. This may entail a complete loss of
income. This loss of support can have an especially tremendous impact on
the defendant’s children. These children are truly innocent. The
shareholders made the choice of purchasing those corporate shares; the
children did not choose their parents. Purchasing shares of a corporation
always entails some degree of risk. Loss of share value is one of the many
risks that share ownership entails.
There is no justification for
distinguishing loss of share value that results from corporate crime from
other types of share value loss. Moreover, in many cases the shareholders
will have other sources of income to rely on in the event the shares lose all
or a substantial amount of their value. Institutional shareholders (and many
individual shareholders) will manage the risk of this through
diversification. On the other hand, in many cases the incarceration of a
parent will deprive the defendant’s children of all financial support, which
may result in destitution without reliance on government assistance.
The spillover effect argument includes the claim that the shareholders
were not responsible for the criminal act and could not have prevented it.
They may have no legal responsibility for the crime, but it is does not
necessarily follow that they could not have to some degree prevented it.
Children are truly not able to prevent their parent from committing a crime.
The same cannot be said with respect to shareholders and corporate crime.
While the “retired couple” is often used as the example of an innocent
shareholder, the reality is that a substantial portion of corporate shares are
held by institutional investors. It is widely known that they are
sophisticated and have substantial economic clout. They do have the
ability to influence corporate management, and the risk of partial or total
loss of share value gives these investors the incentive to do so.
There are truly innocent parties significantly impacted by criminal
convictions, but they are not the shareholders. It is the family members,
especially children. There is little concern expressed about them in debates
over sentencing policy. The corporate apologists never express any
concern about these truly innocent parties. They typically are left out of
the broader narrative on the collateral effects of conviction and punishment.
If there were genuine concern about these innocents, should we not expect
to find it integrated into criminal sentencing guidelines?
The same point should be made about others impacted by the spillover
effect. The corporate criminal immunity argument refers to innocent
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employees who may lose their jobs if their company is prosecuted and
convicted. It also cites innocent suppliers that also will incur financial loss.
Such losses will obviously occur in some cases of corporate criminal
prosecution, but exactly the same thing happens in many cases of
individual criminal prosecutions. If a physician is incarcerated for
Medicaid fraud, his or her employees may lose their jobs. Suppliers of the
medical practice may incur a financial loss. Has this resulted in lenient
treatment of these individual defendants?
The basic problem with the spillover effect argument is that the
concern for the innocents is highly selective and unjustifiably so. The fact
of the matter is that the “innocents” who the corporate apologists focus on
cannot be used to support corporate criminal immunity because that
argument logically applied in the broader context of individual criminal
liability would fundamentally undermine the use of the criminal sanction
across the board. If a negative impact on innocent family members—
individuals who are far more innocent than shareholders—is a justification
for immunity from prosecution in the case of individuals, then there would
have to be a massive reduction in such prosecutions. Such a reduction
would have no support as a matter of public policy. It is highly doubtful
that even the corporate apologists would support this sort of change.
5. Corporate Fines.
An issue in the corporate crime debate that is attracting more attention
in recent years is the inadequacy of criminal fines imposed on corporations.
Obviously, how well such fines work depends upon the size, frequency and
likelihood of the fine being imposed.222 While it is true that in some cases
the fines imposed on a corporation by government regulators, criminal
court judges, or through a DPA are perceived by many to be a staggering
amount of money, the reality is that these fines most likely have little, if
any, deterrent effect on corporate wrongdoing because they are far too
small. For example, in the GM case the fine imposed under the DPA was
$900 million. While this sounds like an enormous amount of money,
critics have compared this to the $156 billion in GM revenue, suggesting
that it is woefully inadequate.223
The most commonly voiced explanation for this is that the company
executives see such fines merely as one of the many costs of doing
business. Even if the fine is perceived to be a very large amount of money,
paying the fine has no financial impact on them personally and may have

222. Vandall, supra note 72.
223. See generally Schlegel, supra note 124, at 23.
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little, if any, financial impact on the company. The problem of inadequacy
of fines is an important part of the proposals outlined in Part III.
6. Reluctance of Prosecutors to Bring Cases Against Corporations.
In the discussion on problems with individual criminal liability we
touched on the matter of prosecutors being reluctant to bring criminal cases
against individual defendants.224 This is a significant problem with local
prosecutors in state court. There are relatively few prosecutions of whitecollar defendants in that venue. It was suggested that this is due to a
combination of political, sociological, and financial (i.e. lack of adequate
resources) factors rather than any lack of statutes in the criminal code.225
This also explains why white-collar prosecutions are more common in
federal court, where these factors have much less influence on the decision
to prosecute as well as on the outcome of each case.
The hurdles that make prosecution of white-collar defendants
problematic in state court are far more daunting when the defendant is a
corporation. As in a case of individual defendants, prosecutors may be
politically and socially connected with the executives of the corporation
that may become the subject of a criminal prosecution. The corporation
may be a significant local employer such that the decision to prosecute may
entail electoral consequences for the prosecutor, nearly all of whom are
elected officials. Prosecuting street criminals may be perceived as
generating political benefits and at a much lower cost.226 The problem of
adequate resources would be much more significant when the defendant is
a corporation. A corporate defendant may possess enormous resources that
can be used to overwhelm a local prosecutor, who, along with pursuing a
case against that corporation, is responsible for prosecuting the typical
array of street crime, domestic violence, etc.227 A local prosecutor
contemplating bringing a case against a large, powerful corporation may
conclude that there are not adequate resources available to prosecute that
case and, at the same time, carry out the other, routine responsibilities of
the office. This theory is difficult to test because there are so few cases in
which a local prosecutor brings a criminal case against a large corporate
defendant. It is especially difficult to test with respect to dangerous
products because the only known case is one in which a local prosecutor in
Indiana brought a reckless homicide case against Ford Motor Company for

224.
225.
226.
227.

See Stemen & Frederick, supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See Stemen & Frederick, supra notes 153, at 153 and accompanying text.
Steinzor, supra note 155, at 463.
Id. at 6.
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three deaths caused by a safety defect in Ford Pintos.228 Three local
residents were burned to death after the vehicle in which they were riding
was stuck from behind, resulting in a ruptured fuel tank and fire. In the
book Reckless Homicide?: Ford’s Pinto Trial,229 Lee Strobel discusses the
case brought against Ford Motor Company based on their manufacture of
the Pinto. In what has been termed the “only case in American history in
which a corporation was criminally prosecuted for knowingly marketing a
dangerously defective product,”230 Ford was charged with three counts of
reckless homicide. The primary account of this case suggests that the
prosecutor was overwhelmed by the defense mounted by Ford’s lawyers,
with the case (perhaps not surprisingly) ending in a not guilty verdict for
Ford.231
Federal prosecutors are in a situation that differs from local
prosecutors in some important ways. Foremost among them is access to
greater resources, which in a case of prosecuting a corporation can make a
significant difference in the decision to prosecute and the outcome of that
prosecution. Federal prosecutors are appointed rather than elected and,
therefore, less politically connected to local corporate executives and, more
importantly, much less susceptible to electoral consequences arising out of
their decision to prosecute than are local prosecutors.232 In theory, this
should make them more willing and effective in prosecuting corporate
crime, so the glaring gap in federal criminal law handicaps the very
prosecutors that are in the best position to bring and win these cases. This
makes adding a new federal statute to fill this gap critical, but the gap in the
law is not the only problem and may not be the most serious problem.233
This is because despite the differences just mentioned, federal prosecutors
are in a situation that is similar in some respects to local prosecutors. They
may be socially connected to local corporate executives in the same ways
that local prosecutors are socially connected to them. If that is the case, it
may undermine their objectivity with respect to the decision on whether to
prosecute.
The decision of a federal prosecutor to bring a case against corporate
228. See generally LEE STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE? FORD’S PINTO TRIAL (1980).
229. Id.
230. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, “Crimtorts” as Corporate Just Desserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 289, 313 (1998).
231. STROBEL, supra note 228.
232. Steinzor, supra note 155, at 6.
233. See Frank J. Vandall, The Criminalization of Products Liability: An Invitation to Political
Abuse, Preemption, and Non-enforcement, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 341, 344 (2008).
The U.S. Attorney considers a number of criteria in deciding whether to bring a specific
case. Those criteria include: the social importance of the case, the number of other cases
on her desk, the time needed to prosecute the case, the expense of the litigation, the
likelihood of victory, and the President’s agenda.
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executives also can be significantly influenced by that prosecutor’s career
aspirations and DOJ personnel policies. DOJ policies on promotions and
salaries may result in focusing on a prosecutor’s won-lost record.234
Prosecuting a corporate defendant, which typically can be expected to
invest an enormous amount of resources in defending itself, may be passed
over in favor of prosecuting easier—more “winnable”—cases, such as
individual street criminals and perhaps individual white-collar defendants
as well. These factors provide a plausible explanation for why federal
prosecutors who, in theory, have access to far greater resources than local
prosecutors, fail to prosecute large corporations for wrongful activities,
including selling dangerous products. Those same factors, along with the
gap in the criminal code, also provide a plausible explanation for the
frequent use by federal prosecutors of DPAs. This problem will be
addressed next.
7. Excessive Use of DPAs.
While a DPA entered into between a corporation and the prosecutor
on behalf of the government may encompass some positive changes in the
corporate structure and compliance regime, they clearly are not the same as
a guilty plea.235 It is common for a DPA to specify that the company denies
any wrongdoing, so it lacks the moral condemnation that a guilty plea or
guilty verdict entails. Even if the DPA includes a large fine, a DPA does
not entail a conviction and the stigma that would go with it, which will
undermine its deterrent effect. The deterrent effect is further undermined if
the negotiated fine may be considered “just the cost of doing business.”
Finally, the matter of fairness of DPAs should be considered. The
regular use of DPAs with corporations and their very infrequent use with
individual defendants raises a question about the fairness of this practice.
For individual defendants, especially those accused of street crimes, the
choices given to them by the prosecutor are quite limited and unattractive.
The choices are pleading guilty or going to trial with the risk of being
convicted. With the latter choice, if the defendant is convicted, the
punishment imposed likely will be much harsher than it would be if the
defendant agreed to plead guilty.236 It would be very rare for a case against
an individual defendant to be resolved with a DPA in which the defendant

234. EISINGER, supra note 23.
235. See generally David M. Uhlman, Deferred Prosecution and Non-prosecution Agreements and
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295 (2013).
236. Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, Bureau of Justice
Assistance: U.S. Dept. of Justice (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearch
Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/49ZS-LDR2].
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admits no wrongdoing and agrees to pay a fine. Even if the fine is a hefty
one, the DPA entails no moral stigma and, more importantly, entails no
finding or admission of guilt. This is significant because if there is a
finding or admission of guilt, the defendant will be treated much more
harshly if he enters the criminal justice system in the future.237 There is no
doubt that an individual defendant would prefer to resolve a case against
him with a DPA, but that choice would rarely be offered. Giving a
corporate defendant the opportunity to enter into a DPA is grossly unfair
and is evidence of corporate coddling. While some commentators have
argued that the use of DPAs leads to over-inclusive enforcement, giving
prosecutors too much discretion and forcing even innocent corporations to
accept responsibility to avoid prosecution,238 we believe that, overall, DPAs
give corporations an unfair advantage over individual defendants and
undermine the essential policy goals of the criminal law.
This section has shown that there is an array of problems with the
current regime of state and federal criminal law as applied to individuals
and corporations that sell dangerous products. In addition to gaps in the
law and inadequate fines, there are sociological and organizational
problems that undermine its effectiveness in addressing the problem. The
next part of the article will discuss ways to remedy these problems and our
proposal for needed reforms.

III. A TWO-PRONGED SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DANGEROUS
VEHICLES
The forgoing discussion has shown that there is an array of problems
that has contributed to the inability of the current regime of state and
federal criminal law to adequately address the matter of injuries and death
caused by dangerous vehicles. While not every one of these problems has
a solution, we will argue that a few specifically targeted reforms put in
place simultaneously would bring about a significant improvement in this
area of the law. Using terminology associated with the American Legal
Realist Movement,239 the necessary reforms can be separated into the law
“in books” and the law “in action.” Both will be discussed in this part of
the article.

237. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bryant, Section 3 E1.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Bargaining
with the Guilty, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 1269 (1995).
238. See e.g., Weissmann, supra note 117, at 1322 (arguing that under current policy “no systemic
checks effectively restrict the government’s power to go after corporations”).
239. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910).
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A. THE LAW IN BOOKS

1.

New Federal Criminal Statute Needed

To give federal prosecutors the statutory tools they need to effectively
prosecute cases involving dangerous vehicles, the glaring gap in the federal
criminal code must be repaired. Congress has already made the judgment
that the specific conduct targeted in the TREAD Act should be prohibited
and, in some cases, imposed criminal liability for violation of TREAD
provisions. Arguably, the enactment of the TREAD Act reflected
Congress’s judgment that tort law was inadequate to assure automobile
safety and needed to be supplemented with an alternative sanctioning
mechanism. However, it is clear that at least in the Toyota and GM cases
the existing scheme was still inadequate. The fear of possible civil
penalties, even compensatory awards supplemented by punitive damages,
did not provide a sufficient deterrent effect. Nor did the fear of criminal
prosecution under the TREAD Act motivate the manufacturers to report the
defect in a timely manner.
Following the Toyota recalls, there were calls for legislative reforms.
In the wake of the GM recalls, Ralph Nader, among others, called for
statutory reforms.240 Legislative proposals focused on increasing civil
penalties241 and mandating greater disclosure of defects.242 The latest of
these proposals, the Grow America Act of 2015243 proposed increased civil
240. Press Release (April 8, 2014). Center for Corporate Policy, http://www.corporatepolicy.
org/2014/04/08/after-gm-disaster-nader-groups-call-for-criminal-liability-for-hiding-product-dangers/
[https://perma.cc/5592-GEWY].
241. J. Plungis, GM hearings revive debate on tougher corporate penalties. ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH (2014), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/gm-hearings-revive-debate-on-toughercorporate-penalties/article_f3216ad4-33d3-5efd-9091-a0ce499b3245.html
[https://perma.cc/L3ZMCVW9]. For example, Senate Bill 1743 proposed increased civil penalties and criminal sanctions
where a business or corporate officer received “actual knowledge” of a serious danger associated with a
covered product, and failed to verbally inform the appropriate federal agency “as soon as practicable
and no later than 24 hours after acquiring such knowledge.” S. 1743, 114th Cong. § 2082 (a)(1) (2015).
242. For example, Senate Bill 1743 proposed imposing additional early warning reporting
requirements on automobile manufacturers. H.R. 1743, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015). Any information
disclosed to the NHTSA would be disclosed to the public through an early warning reporting database.
H.R. 1743, 114th Cong. § 102 (c)(i)(II) (2015). Under House Bill 1181 an automobile manufacturer
would have had a duty to send to the DOT “a true or representative copy of each communication to the
manufacturer’s dealers or to the owners or purchasers of a motor vehicle” concerning any safety defect
or failure to comply with motor vehicle safety standard. H.R. 1181, 114th Cong. § 101 (1)(a),(b)
(2015). If a motor vehicle was determined to have a defect, dealers would be forbidden from selling or
leasing a used vehicle until the defect was remedied. H.R. 1181, 114th Cong. § 205(k) (2015).
243. H.R. 2410, 114th Cong. (2015).
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penalties for failure to report safety defects.244 To date, only one legislative
response has been enacted into law—the Motor Vehicle Safety
Whistleblower Act.245 This Act offers a “bounty” to auto insiders who
reported serious safety violations.
While we are not opposed to increasing sanctions for failure to report
safety defects, we believe that this fails to get to the root of the problem.
Currently, there is no law that prohibits an automobile manufacturer from
selling cars that it knows will kill or injure people. Increasing the penalties
for failure to notify people of these defects is a laudable first step but is
inadequate to deal with the problems discussed in Part II.
To repair the glaring gap in the federal criminal code we propose the
enactment of a new criminal statute that would make it a federal crime for
any person or corporation to intentionally or recklessly place into interstate
commerce a vehicle or components of a vehicle knowing or having reason
to know it has a defect that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
2.

Features of the Statute

Note that our proposal would apply to individuals and to corporations.
It would also apply to suppliers of automotive components and vehicle
manufacturers.
Deterring suppliers from selling components to
manufacturers that they know or have reason to know are defective would
significantly reduce the likelihood that a vehicle with such a component
would ever be sold to a consumer. Liability would be based on an
intentional act, defining intent in the conventional way in the case of an
individual246 and using the corporate ethos theory in the case of a
corporation, or upon recklessness, defining reckless in the conventional
way.247 Allowing liability based on recklessness is based on the concern
that in an organizational setting, decision making often is so fragmented
that it is difficult to find an individual who made a specific decision with
specific knowledge. Attaching liability for recklessness would allow
liability to be based on disregard of the risk associated with a defective
vehicle or component.
The proposed statute would base liability on a defective vehicle or
component that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. The
purpose of this is to impose liability without having to wait for someone to

244.
245.
246.
247.

H.R. 2410 § 4110.
49 U.S.C § 30172 (2015).
LaFave, supra note 145, at § 5.2.
LaFave, supra note 145, at § 5.4.
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be killed or seriously injured. Of course, a provision could be added to the
statute that would enhance the punishment(s) if the defect actually causes a
death or serious injury.
B. PUNISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
1.

Monetary Fine

In the case of an individual convicted under the statute based on
intent, punishment should include a monetary fine. If a fine is intended to
deter (specifically, or generally, or both), then it will fail to accomplish that
goal unless it is large enough to “hurt.” Because the wealth of individuals
who might be prosecuted under this statute would range from modest (i.e.
middle management, automotive engineers) to high (i.e., corporate
executives), the amount of the fine should correspondingly range from
modest to large. In this context, we urge the adoption of the day fine as an
equitable method to address the problem of large wealth disparities among
defendants in this and other criminal cases. The amount of the fine would
be based on one day of the defendant’s income multiplied by a specified
number that is calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the offense. Because
the executive’s income for a day is far larger than is the case for someone
in middle management, the total amount of the fine imposed on the
executive will be correspondingly larger.248 In addition, there should also
be a provision in both sections of the statute prohibiting reimbursement to
the individual defendant by the corporation and another provision
specifying that the amount of the fine is not a deductible business expense
for purposes of federal income tax.
It is reasonable to ask whether a monetary fine, of any size, will
provide meaningful deterrence. In theory, there is an amount of money
that, if imposed as a criminal fine, will deter corporate executives from
engaging in the kind of wrongful behavior that the statute targets. It is
reasonable to believe that in the white-collar arena, the corporate actor
might actually calculate the costs and benefits of his action.249
Manufacturing and marketing a dangerous vehicle presumably fits into the
same category. However, because the likelihood of detection and
248. For a discussion of the day fine and examples from Sweden and Germany see PHILIP L.
REICHEL, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS: A TOPICAL APPROACH, 234–35 (6th ed. 2013).
249. Lynch, supra note 125, at 45 (White-collar crime is “by definition carried out in the economic
arena, where the pursuit of financial profit and the calculation of the costs and risks of choices is
characteristic. Mail fraud, unlike murder, is not commonly a crime of blinding passion.”).
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prosecution is perceived to be small, the threat of criminal penalties might
offer scant deterrent effect.250 It is for this reason that the punishments
under the proposed statute must include incarceration and community
corrections.
2.

Incarceration

More important than a monetary fine is the potential for incarceration.
Including incarceration in the array of punishments in the statute will go far
in deterring the targeted conduct, as well as signaling society’s
condemnation of it. Relatively brief periods of incarceration can be
expected to adequately deter, except in situations of multiple convictions of
an individual defendant—in which case longer periods of incarceration
would be justified. An option that should be considered in the statute is
making incarceration mandatory in cases in which the defective vehicle or
component causes a death. Such a measure would prevent judges from
imposing monetary fines in lieu of incarceration in cases where effective
deterrence or society’s moral condemnation call for incarceration.
3.

Community corrections

Sanctions such as community service and probation would be
appropriate to include in the array of punishments under the statute. These
might be imposed in conjunction with a monetary fine or incarceration. As
such they should be expected to contribute to effective deterrence as well
as to signal society’s condemnation of the conduct targeted in the statute.
C. PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATE DEFENDANTS
As we suggested in Part II, while it is important to hold individuals
accountable when they are responsible for the sale of a dangerous vehicle,
this should not be the limit of criminal liability. Holding the corporation
accountable is important. In some cases, we may not be able to find an
individual who is responsible, and typically the corporate culture is a
significant factor in shaping the attitudes and behavior of its employees.

250. The amount of the monetary fine—at any level—must be discounted by the probability of
detection, prosecution, and conviction. If corporate executives see this probability as exceedingly
small, there may not be a monetary fine of any size that will provide meaningful deterrence. DAVID J.
PYLE, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (1983); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 7.1-7.2 (2011).
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Monetary Fines

Monetary fines should be included among the array of punishments
specified in the statute. However, for reasons we set out in Part II, we
believe that monetary fines should not be at the heart of corporate criminal
punishment. Too often, monetary fines—even very large monetary fines—
do not provide adequate deterrence because they are seen as merely the
cost of doing business. And, for the same reason, they do not adequately
signal society’s condemnation of the defendant’s conduct. This is
especially the case when the fine is part of a DPA.
2..

New Punishment Strategies

Because monetary fines are inadequate and incarceration is obviously
not a punishment option in the case of a corporate defendant, we believe
that new, more creative punishments (i.e. corporate incapacitation) should
be implemented in such cases. Starting with the least severe, we propose
that in an appropriate case, a convicted corporation be debarred from
government (state, or federal, or both) contracts for a meaningful period.
Governments are customers of automobile manufacturers with the purchase
of vehicle fleets on a regular basis. Debarring a convicted manufacturer
from supplying vehicles under a government contract for a meaningful
period will have an impact on corporate profits and, therefore, have some
deterrent effect. It would also signal society’s condemnation of the
defendant. However, because governments are not a significant portion of
automobile manufacturers’ customer base, debarment alone would clearly
not be an adequate punishment.
Suspension of or restrictions of a business license on a state or local
basis for a meaningful period would have a greater deterrent effect than
debarment. For example, a corporation convicted in a state criminal
prosecution might be prohibited from selling vehicles in that state for a
period of time. On the federal level, suspension of or restrictions on a
corporate charter for a meaningful period would have an even greater
deterrent effect because it could be national in scope. This sanction would
be effective only at the federal level because only on that level would it
prevent a convicted corporation from shifting business operations from a
state in which it is restricted or suspended to different states to minimize
the financial impact of the sanction. Clearly, the suspension or restriction
of a corporate charter would be an unambiguous signal of society’s
condemnation of the defendant.
Finally, in egregious cases, including situations in which the corporate
defendant has multiple convictions over a period of time, revocation of the
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corporate charter should be available as a sentencing option, especially in
cases where the defective vehicle was placed intentionally in interstate
commerce and caused loss of life. Justifications for this corporate “death”
penalty are not difficult to find. One need only look at the justifications for
the proliferation over the last few years of death penalty provisions in
federal and state criminal statutes.251 This last point is not intended as an
endorsement of the death penalty for individuals on either the state or the
federal level. Instead, we are suggesting that if the death penalty is
available to impose on individual defendants, there is no reason that the
corporate “death penalty” should not also be imposed in cases where a
corporation knowingly places a dangerous vehicle in interstate commerce
and causes loss of life. Even if the evidence on the deterrent effect may
turn out to be ambiguous, there is no penalty that would send a clearer
signal to a convicted corporate defendant that society is condemning their
conduct. The corporate form is a privilege. A corporation that has caused
the loss of life through an intentional act does not deserve to continue to
enjoy those benefits, especially when there are prior convictions for the
same offense. As is the case with suspension or restrictions on a corporate
charter, revocation of a corporate charter would be most effective at the
federal level because only on that level would it prevent a convicted
corporation from evading the penalty by simply incorporating in another
state and continuing with business as usual.252 The statute also should
authorize the sentencing judge to use his or her equitable powers to bar
individual corporate officers from re-incorporating under a new name and
from engaging in the same type of business in the future under any
organizational form.
3.

Restitution

In a departure from traditional criminal punishments, but in keeping
with the recent trends in punishment, we urge that restitution be part of the
array of sanctions that can be imposed on a corporate defendant convicted
251. See, e.g., Jay D. Aronson & Simon A. Cole, Science and the Death Penalty: DNA, Innocence,
and the Debate Over Capital Punishment in the United States, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 603 (2009).
252. In nineteen states the professional licenses of people who fall behind on their student loan
payments can be revoked. These states are obviously unconcerned by the fact that without the license
the debtor will be unable to earn money with which to pay their student load debt. These states also are
obviously unconcerned by any “spillover effect” that might result with respect to the debtor’s children,
spouse, partners, employees, etc. If individuals are having their professional licenses revoked for
falling behind on their student loan payments, surely it is fair to revoke the business license or charter of
a corporation that kills people by knowingly selling dangerous vehicles. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg,
Stacy Cowley & Natalie Kitroeff, When Unpaid Student Loan Bills Mean You Can No Longer Work,
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 18, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/18/business/student-loans-licenses.
html [https://perma.cc/9AA3-A29V]l.

DOWELLISWITHTRACKCHANGESLASTMINUTE_11.19%5B1%5D.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2019

CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DANGEROUS VEHICLES

12/13/2018 10:42 AM

49

under the statute. As we suggested in Part II, a significant shortcoming of
both administrative fines and traditional monetary fines in criminal cases is
that the victims’ need for compensation is completely overlooked. Both
administrative fines and criminal fines are paid to the government. While
this may be effective in some cases in deterring future criminal behavior
and signaling society’s condemnation of the defendant’s conduct, it does
nothing to remedy the significant hardships associated with the death or
serious injury caused by the defendant’s conduct. The statute should
require the sentencing judge to order that restitution be provided by
convicted defendants to injured victims and the families of those killed by
dangerous vehicles.253
4.

Constitutionality

It goes without saying that all federal statutes must be solidly based on
more or more enumerated powers granted to Congress in the
Constitution.254 The federal statute proposed here is clearly within the
scope of the interstate commerce power. While it is true that starting with
United States v. Lopez in 1995,255 the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed to
some extent the scope of the interstate commerce power. That trend, if it is
a trend, has been limited to those activities affecting interstate commerce
and has not impacted Congress’s power to regulate the channels or
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.256 The criminal statute we
propose here is on constitutional ground as solid as the federal felon in
possession statute257 and the federal carjacking statute,258 to name just two.

253. There is an empirical question on whether and to what extent various punishments deter
corporations and corporate executives. The literature does not provide a clear answer, but the
consensus is that the threat of punishment does deter. Schlegel, supra note 124, at 15-24; Schell-Busey,
Simpson, & Rorie, supra note 151, at 387. Even if the matter remains the subject of some debate,
however, we do not believe that this undermines the soundness of our proposals. Even if there were not
convincing evidence that the punishments we propose deter, it is critical to keep in mind that there are
justifications for punishment other than deterrence. Punishment can be (and in the case of dangerous
vehicles, ought to be) justified as a matter of just desert. Even if some specific punishment may not
deter, it is nevertheless appropriate because it expresses society’s condemnation of the corporation and
its managers. In the case of a corporate defendant it is punishment for maintaining a corporate ethos
that led to the deaths and injuries.
254. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Tiers of Scrutiny in Enumerated Powers Jurisprudence, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 575 (2013).
255. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
256. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 4.8(b), 4.9(d) (8th ed.
2010). See also, e.g., Victoria Davis, A Landmark Lost: The Anemic Impact of United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624, On the Federalization of Criminal Law, 75 NEB. L. REV. 115 (1996).
257. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). See, e.g., Barbara H. Taylor, Close Enough for Government Work:
Proving Minimal Nexus in a Federal Firearms Conviction: United States v. Corey, 56 ME. L. REV. 187
(2004).
258. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2012). See generally Klein & Grobey, supra note 132.
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The federal statute we propose here is an essential element in
remedying the inadequacies of the current legal regime dealing with
injuries and death caused by dangerous vehicles. However, we have
already suggested that while new laws will give federal prosecutors the
needed statutory tools to prosecute automobile manufacturers and their
employees, these laws clearly would not be sufficient to bring about the
necessary changes in how the law works in such cases. We have already
suggested in Part II that a study of the law “in action,” that is, how the law
works in the real world, points to the significant need for organizational
reform in the DOJ. The next section will address this important matter.
C.

THE LAW IN ACTION

In Part IIC we highlighted the reasons why there is a lack of criminal
prosecutions for injuries and deaths caused by dangerous vehicles. These
problems exist on the state and local level with respect to both prosecutions
of individuals and of corporations. They also exist, but to a far lesser
extent, on the federal level.
We outlined the array of economic, political, and sociological
problems on the state and local level that render prosecutors unable and
unwilling to bring criminal cases against corporate executives and other
corporate employees. These problems become even more daunting when
the subject of a potential prosecution is a corporation, which can be
expected to mount a far more rigorous and costly defense than would be the
case with an individual defendant, even a wealthy defendant. In light of
this reality, we believe that the multitude of problems with prosecuting
both corporations and corporate executives on the state and local level are
insurmountable. The lack of adequate resources is chronic. The inherent
responsibility of local prosecutors for prosecuting other crime demands an
overwhelming majority of their resources and attention.259 The potential
political fallout from prosecuting either a corporation or a corporate
executive is paralyzing, so long as the office of local prosecutor is an
elected office. We believe that these insurmountable problems require that
we pin our hopes on federal prosecutors to effectively deal with deaths and
injuries caused by dangerous vehicles. Even though federal prosecutors are
free from some of the handicaps under which local prosecutors operate,
their situation is in some ways similar to that of a local prosecutor. For this
reason, we propose that the following reforms be implemented in addition
to the statutory proposal outlined in Part III A.

259. Steinzor, supra note 155, at 63.
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Outside Review of Decisions to Not Prosecute and of DPAs

Federal prosecutors enjoy far more political independence than local
prosecutors could ever enjoy; however, they may still be socially connected
with corporate executives, especially if they are in a district in which the
corporation has a substantial presence. These personal connections may
result in more lenient treatment of a corporation or its executives than
justified. For this reason, we propose that the DOJ adopt a policy requiring
an evaluation by outside prosecutors of a decision to not prosecute a
corporation or corporate executives when there has been a death or serious
injury caused by a defective vehicle. Prosecutors brought in from another
district can insure a reasonable measure of independent decision making on
this critical matter. We propose that the same sort of outside review take
place anytime there are negotiations underway to enter into a DPA.260
While a DPA may be appropriate in some cases, there is a substantial risk
that they will resolve a case in a manner that is far too lenient with respect
to the policy goals of the criminal law.
2.

Adequate Resources

Federal prosecutors enjoy an abundance of resources compared with
the amount of resources usually available to local prosecutors; however, the
prosecution of a corporate executive may require resources beyond the
amount federal prosecutors need for a typical case. The prosecution of a
corporation would most likely require an even greater amount of resources.
We propose instituting a policy requiring all United States Attorneys to
monitor criminal prosecutions of corporations and their executives and to
ensure that the prosecutors who are handling such cases have sufficient
resources to respond to whatever level of defense is put up by the
defendant.
3.

DOJ Personnel Policies

We suggested in Part II that a significant reason for federal
prosecutors’ reluctance to bringing criminal cases against corporations and
corporate executives can be found in DOJ policies relating to salaries and
promotions, especially the emphasis on an individual prosecutor’s “wonlost ” record. The career aspirations of a typical federal prosecutor may

260. Steinzor states that “prosecutors are rarely asked why they fail to pursue white-collar criminal
enforcement . . . . and their motivations have never been studied empirically at the federal level.” Id. at
42. An outside review of decisions to not prosecute would inject a measure of fairness into the process.
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incline him or her to avoid bringing cases against corporations and other
defendants who could be expected to put up a significant defense and,
instead, bring cases against street criminals and other individual defendants
who, without the help of a public defender, are barely able to put up any
defense. This may be a significant part of the problem addressed in this
article. We urge the DOJ to review its own personnel policies and those of
each U.S. Attorney’s office. Policies that focus heavily on won-lost
records for purposes of salary and promotion should be abandoned in favor
of policies that reward tackling difficult cases, especially cases against
corporations that have engaged in intentional or reckless behavior that
results in loss of life or serious personal injury. Other things being equal, a
“loss” in such as case should be given more credit than a “win” in a case
against an individual defendant.
4.

Curtail the Use of DPAs

The final reform we propose is for the DOJ to adopt a policy that
curtails the use of DPAs generally, especially in cases involving large
corporations. Although there are some legitimate uses of PDAs, we
suggested in Part II that a PDA in which the defendant denies any
wrongdoing, completely lacks the moral condemnation which is an
essential part of a criminal conviction, and even when it includes a large
monetary fine, fails to provide an adequate deterrent. We propose a policy
that normally gives corporate defendants the same limited and unattractive
options that are given to individual defendants: plead guilty (perhaps to
reduced charges) and accept the punishment offered or plead not guilty and
bear the risk of conviction and a much harsher punishment. If a case has
unusual circumstances suggesting that a DPA is the best way to resolve a
criminal charge, an outside review of the case should be required before the
agreement is given final approval.

CONCLUSION
We are aware that those who are concerned with the overcriminalization of American business specifically or American society
generally will hesitate to support our proposal, which openly pushes for an
additional criminal statute and increased enforcement of all criminal
statutes relating to the manufacture and sale of dangerous vehicles. Those
who advocate blanket corporate criminal immunity most likely will
experience apoplexy well before reaching this portion of the article. In
light of the varying degrees of resistance that our proposals will meet, it
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should be emphasized that when a manufacturer negligently designs and
sells a defective car (or any other consumer product), civil liability under
tort law or regulatory action is appropriate. We do not see a moral
compulsion in this situation to punish the manufacturer and do not see
these actions as particularly blameworthy. The civil tort law and regulatory
regimes, while not perfect, are the appropriate way to deal with such cases.
On the other hand, in a situation like the Toyota or GM cases, where a
manufacturer discovers a defect in its vehicle that is likely to lead to death
or serious bodily injury, and it does lead to death and serious bodily injury,
and the manufacturer learns of this and still does nothing—fails to notify
the public, fails to recall the car, and lies to the regulatory agency
responsible for promoting safety in the industry—its action is worthy of
moral condemnation, and criminal liability is appropriate. The problems in
the existing criminal law regime render it inadequate for this task. While
not every one of these problems has a realistic solution, the reforms we
propose, which are aimed at both fixing the glaring gap in federal law and
significantly improving its enforcement, will greatly strengthen the law and
enable it to respond adequately to the problem of deaths and injuries caused
by dangerous vehicles.
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